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Security audit

GiftDrop

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a coherent Solana GiftDrop API guide, but it includes mainnet wallet signing and an automated 0.5 SOL transfer workflow without clear human approval or safety guardrails.

Install only if you are comfortable using a third-party GiftDrop service with a Solana wallet. Use a separate low-balance wallet, verify the host wallet and API domain independently, never expose private keys or API keys in prompts or logs, and require manual approval before any real transaction is signed or broadcast.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (8)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The skill describes API-key registration via wallet signature and authenticated requests, but does not clearly warn that the API key and wallet private key/signing capability are sensitive secrets that must never be exposed to logs, prompts, or untrusted services. In an agent setting, poor secret-handling guidance can lead to credential theft, unauthorized claims, and abuse of the linked wallet identity.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
```bash
MESSAGE="GiftDrop API Key request at $(date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ)"

curl -X POST https://giftdrop.fun/api/v1/keys \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "wallet": "<WALLET_ADDRESS>",
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The skill instructs users or agents to send SOL/SPL tokens to a third-party host wallet and later claim gifts, but it does not prominently warn that these are irreversible on-chain transfers involving real funds. In an agent context, this omission is dangerous because an automated system may execute the workflow without informed user approval, causing direct financial loss if parameters, recipient, or service trust assumptions are wrong.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
### Claim a Gift Drop

```bash
curl -X POST https://giftdrop.fun/api/v1/gift/<GIFT_ID>/claim \
  -H "X-API-Key: gd_..." \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"password": "optional_if_protected"}'
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
# Step 1: Register API Key
msg = f"GiftDrop API Key request at {time.strftime('%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ', time.gmtime())}"
sig = kp.sign_message(msg.encode())
r = requests.post(f"{API}/keys", json={
    "wallet": str(kp.pubkey()),
    "signature": base64.b64encode(bytes(sig)).decode(),
    "message": msg,
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
headers = {"X-API-Key": api_key, "Content-Type": "application/json"}

# Step 2: Send SOL to host wallet
bh_resp = requests.post(RPC, json={"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"getLatestBlockhash","params":[{"commitment":"finalized"}]})
blockhash = Hash.from_string(bh_resp.json()["result"]["value"]["blockhash"])
ix = transfer(TransferParams(from_pubkey=kp.pubkey(), to_pubkey=HOST, lamports=500_000_000))  # 0.5 SOL
msg = MessageV0.try_compile(kp.pubkey(), [ix], [], blockhash)
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
ix = transfer(TransferParams(from_pubkey=kp.pubkey(), to_pubkey=HOST, lamports=500_000_000))  # 0.5 SOL
msg = MessageV0.try_compile(kp.pubkey(), [ix], [], blockhash)
tx = VersionedTransaction(msg, [kp])
tx_resp = requests.post(RPC, json={"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"sendTransaction","params":[base64.b64encode(bytes(tx)).decode(),{"encoding":"base64"}]})
funding_tx = tx_resp.json()["result"]
time.sleep(15)  # wait for confirmation
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
This call submits a signed Solana transaction that transfers funds to the host wallet, making it an irreversible external action with direct monetary impact. In the example, the transfer is initiated programmatically with no explicit confirmation, spending guardrails, or trust validation of the recipient, which is especially risky for autonomous agents.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
time.sleep(15)  # wait for confirmation

# Step 3: Create gift drop
r = requests.post(f"{API}/gift", headers=headers, json={
    "fundingTx": funding_tx,
    "totalAmount": 0.5,
    "totalClaims": 10,
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.