T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:158- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Dependency Installation
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 158–159
Vulnerability Type: Supply-chain risk from unpinned dependencies
Risk Level: LowVulnerable Code:
markdown - Pillow (`pip install Pillow`) - NumPy (`pip install numpy`)Technical Analysis
The documentation instructs users to install Pillow and NumPy without version constraints, package hashes, or a lockfile. These commands resolve mutable package versions from the user's configured Python package index. Consequently, the installed code may differ from the code used during development or security review.
This practice does not prove that either named package is malicious. However, it weakens build reproducibility and supply-chain integrity. A compromised package release, dependency, configured index, or package-distribution account could cause attacker-controlled code to be installed. Python packages may execute code during installation and subsequently when imported by
scripts/read_map.py.Attack Path
- An attacker compromises a relevant package release, transitive dependency, distribution account, or package index used by the victim.
- The victim follows the documented
pip install Pilloworpip install numpycommand. - Because no reviewed version or cryptographic hash is required, pip installs the attacker-controlled artifact.
- Malicious code executes during package installation or when the dependency is imported.
- The code runs with the privileges of the user performing the installation or invoking the Skill.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation could permit arbitrary code execution under the installing user's account. The resulting access could include that user's files, environment variables, network access, and ROS resources available to the process. If the installation is performed with elevated privileges, the impact could extend to system-wide compromise. The practical likelihood depends on c ...[truncated 52 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Provide a reviewed dependency manifest with exact versions, such as:
text Pillow==<reviewed-version> numpy==<reviewed-version> - Generate and verify cryptographic hashes for every package artifact, and install with:
bash python3 -m pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt - Lock transitive dependencies using a tool such as
pip-tools, and review dependency updates before regenerating the lockfile. - Install dependencies inside an isolated virtual environment rather than globally or with administrative privileges.
- Use a trusted package index and, for stronger assurance, an internally controlled artifact mirror containing reviewed packages.
- Add automated dependency vulnerability and integrity scanning to the release process.
- Provide a reviewed dependency manifest with exact versions, such as:
