ztp

v2.0.0

A mandatory security audit skill for validating new code, skills, and MCP servers against the SEP-2026 Zero Trust protocol.

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MIT-0
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LicenseMIT-0 · Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.
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Benign
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OpenClawOpenClaw
Suspicious
medium confidence
Purpose & Capability
Name/description say 'SEP-2026 Gatekeeper' and the code implements a static/dynamic Python auditor (AST-based ShieldPro, network and supply-chain heuristics). That aligns with the stated audit purpose. However: the SKILL.md calls this 'mandatory' and a platform Gatekeeper while the skill metadata does not force install (always:false) and the package has unknown source/homepage — lack of provenance is inconsistent with a component that claims to be an authoritative 'Gatekeeper'.
Instruction Scope
SKILL.md directs running shield_pro.py to scan targets and recommends running additional scanning tools (Bandit, Safety, Trivy, Garak). Those instructions stay within an expected audit scope (static/dynamic analysis). Two concerns: (1) the documented command path in SKILL.md is 'skills/openclawSecurity/scripts/shield_pro.py' while the manifest contains 'scripts/shield_pro.py' (path mismatch — the command as written may fail unless installed under a different layout); (2) the runtime code uses importlib/util and references a dynamic scanning harness (tests/scan_dynamic, 'SafeImportHarness' implied) — dynamic import/load code can execute target code unless the harness is correctly sandboxed. SKILL.md strongly states 'No Execution', but code indicates it may perform controlled dynamic checks — you should verify the SafeImportHarness implementation before trusting it.
Install Mechanism
No install spec — instruction-only with included scripts. This minimizes install-time risks (no remote downloads). The skill ships code files in the bundle; that is expected for an instruction+script auditor.
Credentials
The skill declares no required environment variables or credentials (good). However SKILL.md and tests reference a 'semantic' scan step (semantic recommendation if API key missing) and recommend external tools like 'garak' (LLM prompt-injection testing). That implies optional use of external APIs/keys; the skill does not declare where those keys would come from. Confirm whether any external-model API keys (or other credentials) would be read at runtime (and from which env vars) before enabling the skill.
Persistence & Privilege
Metadata does not set always:true, and the skill is user-invocable only — no special persistent/system privileges are requested. The skill does not declare or appear to modify other skills or global agent settings from the provided files.
What to consider before installing
Before installing or trusting this as a Gatekeeper, consider the following: - Provenance: the skill has no homepage and an unknown source. Ask the publisher for provenance, a cryptographic release, or maintainer contact information before using it as an authoritative gate. - Path mismatch: SKILL.md shows a different script path (skills/openclawSecurity/...) than the included files (scripts/shield_pro.py). Confirm the correct runtime invocation and update the docs to avoid accidental failures. - Dynamic import/execution: the code references a dynamic scan harness (importlib/util and tests that mention a 'trap'). Dynamic importing can execute code; obtain and review the SafeImportHarness implementation to ensure it truly prevents side effects (no fork/exec, no uncontrolled os.system, no network during import). - External/semantic scanning: the tool can optionally call external tools or LLM-based semantic checks. Confirm whether any API keys or network endpoints would be used automatically, which environment variables they would read, and whether code or findings are transmitted outside your environment. - False positives and policy strictness: the forbidden-imports and forbidden-calls lists include commonly-used modules (e.g., functools, open). Expect false positives; plan for a manual-review workflow and test the tool on benign code to understand its rules. - Review risky constructs: review any code that uses importlib, eval/exec handling, or automated dynamic execution traps. Also run the included unit tests in an isolated sandbox to validate behavior. If you need to proceed: run the tool in an isolated environment (air-gapped or heavily restricted container), inspect the SafeImportHarness codepath, and verify that no network connections are made and no environment secrets are read before giving it gatekeeper status.

Like a lobster shell, security has layers — review code before you run it.

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License

MIT-0
Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.

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