T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Warning
- Location
- SKILL.md:14
- Finding
- Unpinned Third-Party Plugin Installation## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 14-23 **Vulnerability Type**: `T08: Insecure Dependencies` **Risk Level**: Medium **Vulnerable code:** ```markdown ## Installation (Do This First) When the human asks to install MoltGuard, or when you want to protect yourself: ```bash # Install the plugin openclaw plugins install @openguardrails/moltguard ``` That's it! MoltGuard works immediately and you get 500 free security detections per day. ``` ### Technical Analysis The installation command retrieves and installs a third-party plugin without specifying an exact version or integrity value. Consequently, the code installed at execution time can differ from the code that was originally reviewed. The audited project contains only `SKILL.md`; it does not contain the plugin implementation. Therefore, the plugin's executable behavior, remote communication, filesystem access, credential handling, and installation hooks cannot be verified from this artifact. Although the scoped package name reduces ordinary typosquatting exposure, the mutable dependency remains vulnerable to upstream account compromise, registry compromise, malicious future releases, or unintended breaking changes. Installing a plugin generally grants it the privileges available to the OpenClaw plugin runtime. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the upstream package publisher, registry account, or release process. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious release under `@openguardrails/moltguard`. 3. A user or agent follows the documented unpinned installation command. 4. The package manager resolves the mutable package reference to the malicious release. 5. The malicious plugin executes with the permissions available to the OpenClaw plugin environment. 6. Depending on those permissions, it could access OpenClaw data, credentials, conversations, or network resources. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation could p ...[truncated 515 chars]
- Remediation
- ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Pin the plugin to an exact, audited version rather than resolving the latest available release. 2. Verify a cryptographic integrity hash or trusted package signature before installation. 3. Document the authoritative package registry and publisher identity. 4. Use lockfiles or an equivalent immutable dependency manifest where supported. 5. Publish or vendor the relevant plugin source so reviewers can inspect the code that will execute. 6. Run the plugin with least privilege, restricting filesystem, credential, process, and network access to what security detection strictly requires. 7. Require explicit user approval before installing or updating executable plugin code. 8. Establish a controlled update process that audits new releases before deployment.