T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
SKILL.md:50- Finding
Unconditional Agent Response Hijacking
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
Deflate is a coherent context-compression skill, but it tells the agent to preserve API keys exactly and write broad conversation details into persistent memory without adequate scoping or consent.
Review before installing. Use only if you are comfortable with persistent memory files, and do not let it store API keys, tokens, passwords, session cookies, private keys, or sensitive personal data. Prefer explicit opt-in memory writes and redaction rules before enabling it in shared or source-controlled workspaces.
SKILL.md:50Unconditional Agent Response Hijacking
SKILL.md:193Verbatim Preservation and Persistent Storage of API Keys
The instructions require preserving sensitive user-provided data, including API keys and exact config values, in compressed summaries. That turns a summarization mechanism into a secret-propagation mechanism, increasing exposure in logs, memory files, future prompts, and any downstream tooling that reads those artifacts.
The skill explicitly instructs the agent to preserve API keys and config values exactly during compression, which creates unnecessary retention of secrets for a context-management feature. In this context, copying secrets into summaries or memory files increases the blast radius of any compromise and exposes credentials across sessions without a strong functional need.
The memory flush protocol instructs persistent storage of broad categories of user, project, operational, and contact data across sessions. Without strict minimization, consent, retention limits, and sensitivity filtering, this creates a durable cross-session data accumulation channel that can leak sensitive information far beyond the immediate task.
The README explicitly promotes preserving and carrying forward IDs, dates, amounts, and per-topic notes across compression cycles, which creates a session-persistence mechanism for potentially sensitive data. In a context-compression skill, this increases the chance that personal, financial, or operational identifiers remain in retained context longer than necessary and may be propagated into later prompts, logs, or summaries.
1. **MAP** — Separate conversation into distinct topics
2. **FILTER** — Remove noise (greetings, failed attempts, repeated info)
3. **DISTILL** — Create atomic Cornell notes per topic (keyword + summary + data)
4. **PRESERVE** — IDs, dates, amounts survive compression unchanged
5. **COMBINE** — Merge notes with most important first (prevents "lost in the middle")
Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.
Copy the SKILL.md file to your agent's skills directory:
~/.openclaw/workspace/skills/deflate/SKILL.md
The manifest says the skill prevents recursive summarization degradation, yet the documented workflow instructs the agent to compress context, flush distilled notes to MEMORY.md, and then start a new session that reads MEMORY.md back in. That creates the exact kind of summary-chaining the description says it avoids, so the stated intent conflicts with the prescribed behavior.
The trigger list contains broad everyday terms like 'new', 'session', 'cost', and 'flush', making accidental activation likely during unrelated conversations. Because this skill can alter response behavior and initiate persistence to MEMORY.md, unintended invocation raises meaningful security and privacy risk.
The file provides mandatory example outputs and repeated status formats in Spanish such as "Veo que ya cerramos," "Guardé," and "Contexto," and says every response must include a specific format. There is no indication that users can choose another language, making this a natural-language locale policy concern.
The skill directs the agent to write decisions, project data, configs, lessons learned, contacts, and costs to MEMORY.md without a clear warning or consent mechanism about persistence. In a context-compression skill, silent long-term storage of conversational data is especially dangerous because users may expect ephemeral summarization, not durable retention across sessions.
No suspicious patterns detected.