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Security audit

OpenClaw Workspace Starter Agent Home Template

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This Markdown-only template is not malware, but it gives an agent broad persistent memory and background workspace authority with loose boundaries.

Review and tighten the workspace rules before installing. Change standing orders so they never override system, safety, privacy, or current-user instructions; restrict no-ask actions to read-only or clearly reversible tasks; require approval for background file edits, email/calendar checks, external messages, backups, and any sensitive data handling; avoid storing secrets or highly personal details in memory files.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SOUL.md:41
Finding
Persistent Agent Instruction Hijacking Through Unbounded Standing Orders## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SOUL.md:41-54`, reinforced by `SOUL.md:70`, `AGENTS.md:11-17`, and `SKILL.md:21-24` **Vulnerability Type**: Persistent workspace instruction-priority manipulation **Risk Level**: High ### Vulnerable Code Snippets `SOUL.md:41-54`: ```md ## Step 3: Standing Orders These are rules your agent ALWAYS follows. They override everything else. **Copy the ones you want into "Your standing orders" below** (or write your own): - [ ] Never explain something I already understand - [ ] If you're not sure, say so — don't guess or make things up - [ ] Ask before doing anything that can't be undone - [ ] Keep responses under 3 paragraphs unless I ask for more - [ ] Don't start messages with compliments or filler ("Great question!", "Absolutely!") - [ ] Match my energy — if I'm brief, be brief. If I'm detailed, be detailed. - [ ] When I ask for a recommendation, give ONE answer, not five options ### Your standing orders: 1. [Your most important rule] 2. [Another rule] 3. [Add more as you discover what annoys you] ``` `SOUL.md:70`: ```md **💡 This file is never "done."** Start simple. After a few days of chatting, you'll notice things that feel off. Come back and tweak. Your agent reads this fresh every session, so changes take effect immediately. ``` `AGENTS.md:11-17`: ```md Your agent wakes up fresh each time (no built-in memory). So every session, it: 1. Reads **SOUL.md** → remembers who it is 2. Reads **USER.md** → remembers who you are 3. Reads today's and yesterday's notes from **memory/** → catches up on recent events 4. Reads **MEMORY.md** → long-term memory (the important stuff) This happens automatically. You don't need to do anything. ``` `SKILL.md:21-24`: ```md ## 3-Step Quick Start 1. **Copy this folder** into your OpenClaw workspace (`~/.openclaw/workspace/`) 2. **Open BOOTSTRAP.md** and follow the 5 steps (fill in 3 files, glance at ...[truncated 3321 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Replace the unrestricted priority statement with explicit precedence boundaries, for example: ```md These are user preferences. Follow them only when they are consistent with system and developer instructions, safety and privacy requirements, applicable policies, and the user's current request. They never override those controls. ``` 2. Separate behavioral preferences from executable or operational instructions. Limit `SOUL.md` to tone, formatting, and communication preferences; place tool policies in a protected, administrator-controlled configuration. 3. Treat all workspace Markdown as untrusted contextual data rather than privileged instructions. The runtime should enforce instruction precedence independently of wording inside workspace files. 4. Validate standing-order changes before activation. Reject or require explicit confirmation for directives that attempt to: - Override higher-priority instructions. - Disable consent or safety checks. - Exfiltrate data or reveal secrets. - Conceal actions or audit records. - Expand tool permissions or execute unrelated operations. 5. Restrict write access to workspace instruction files using least-privilege filesystem permissions. Prevent untrusted integrations, downloaded content, group-chat participants, and automated ingestion pipelines from modifying them. 6. Add integrity monitoring or version control for `SOUL.md`, `AGENTS.md`, and other automatically loaded files. Alert the user to unexpected modifications and provide a trusted rollback mechanism. 7. Display loaded standing orders to the user and require re-approval after material changes, especially before enabling email, messaging, network, or command-execution integrations. 8. Add tests confirming that workspace instructions cannot override system, developer, safety, privacy, or explicit current-user constraints.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (18)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding
The trigger phrases for memory-writing are broad enough that ordinary conversation could plausibly activate persistent note-taking without a clear confirmation step. In a workspace agent, this can cause unintended storage of sensitive or misleading information, which then affects future sessions and may expose private context later.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Content
- **Prefers recoverable actions** (moves to trash instead of permanently deleting)
- **When uncertain, asks you** instead of guessing

## What It Can Do Without Asking

- Read files and explore your workspace
- Search the web
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding
The 'What It Can Do Without Asking' section delegates autonomous decision-making for actions including web access and broad workspace activity, while only loosely constraining what counts as risky. In practice, this can lead to overreach, unexpected side effects, or silent data handling without a clearly enforced approval boundary.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding
The statement that the agent can do 'anything within the workspace' without asking creates an overly broad authorization boundary. That ambiguity can normalize autonomous file modifications, data collection, or other impactful actions beyond what the user reasonably expects from a 'starter' memory template.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding
The guidance to act 'like a real person' in group chats encourages anthropomorphic participation without requiring clear disclosure that it is an agent. This can mislead other participants, reduce informed consent, and increase the chance that the agent reveals inferred or stored information in social contexts.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
The FAQ instructs users to 'delete them and copy the template again' to start over, but it does not clearly warn that deleting workspace files may permanently remove agent memory, notes, and custom configuration. In a template focused on persistence files, this omission can lead to accidental data loss by users following troubleshooting guidance without understanding the consequences.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The file explicitly authorizes background heartbeat tasks to modify files and documentation without a just-in-time approval step. In an autonomous agent context, this creates a real integrity risk: the agent may alter memory, notes, or project files based on ambiguous heuristics, stale context, or prompt manipulation, and the user is not clearly warned about the scope of those changes in the operational instruction itself.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Content
## Background Work (no permission needed)

Your agent can do these during heartbeats without asking:
- Organize and clean up memory files
- Update documentation
- Check on running projects
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The phrase 'without asking' grants the agent autonomous decision-making authority to perform background actions, including organizing memory files and updating documentation. In this skill's context, that autonomy is more dangerous because the heartbeat is designed to run periodically without active user supervision, increasing the chance of unintended changes, overreach into sensitive files, or abuse via malicious content the agent encounters during checks.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding
The guide encourages connecting external messaging platforms and webhook-style integrations without warning that doing so may send conversation content, metadata, or system events to third-party services. In this skill's context, the omission is more dangerous because the document is a beginner-oriented setup guide, so users may enable integrations without understanding privacy, retention, and access-control implications.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
The guide instructs users to add API keys and provider credentials but does not clearly state that these secrets must be protected, scoped, and never exposed in screenshots, chats, logs, or shared config files. In a setup guide for an agent platform, this omission can lead users to handle sensitive credentials unsafely, resulting in account compromise, unauthorized API usage, or takeover of connected services.

Unrestricted Tool Access

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Content
What to do: Leave defaults (they're safe). Consider enabling `/config` if you want to change settings from chat.

⚠️ **Don't enable `/bash`** unless you understand it lets your agent run ANY command on the server.

---
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding
Skill grants unrestricted tool access without appropriate constraints. An agent with unfettered tool access can perform arbitrary actions including file modification, network requests, and code execution.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The template prompts users to provide a broad range of personal information, including timezone, availability, routines, family, and preferences, but does not warn about privacy risks or advise data minimization. In an agent workspace context, this can lead users to overshare sensitive personal data that may be retained, exposed through logs, or reused by downstream tools and other agents.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The document explicitly instructs the agent/user to periodically copy sensitive workspace files such as MEMORY.md, SOUL.md, USER.md, and AGENTS.md, including keeping copies off-machine, but provides no guidance on access controls, encryption, redaction, or handling secrets. This increases the risk of unintentional disclosure of personal data, credentials, internal instructions, or other sensitive context through backups, especially when stored in cloud storage, removable media, or secondary systems.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The README explicitly instructs the agent to create 'raw logs' containing 'everything that happened' and says they are later distilled into long-term memory, but it provides no warning about collecting secrets, personal data, tokens, or other sensitive workspace content. In an agent-home template, this increases the chance that credentials, proprietary data, or user conversations will be persistently stored in plain markdown, expanding the blast radius of any local compromise or accidental disclosure.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding
The README normalizes that the agent will automatically maintain MEMORY.md and create/use workspace folders, but it does not prominently warn users before setup that the skill performs ongoing local writes. In an agent-skill context, hidden persistence matters because users may not realize the agent will continuously store potentially sensitive information in predictable locations.

Scope Creep

Low
Category
Excessive Agency
Content
**USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.**

- The author(s) are NOT liable for any damages, losses, or consequences arising from 
  the use or misuse of this software — including but not limited to financial loss, 
  data loss, security breaches, business interruption, or any indirect/consequential damages.
- This software does NOT constitute financial, legal, trading, or professional advice.
- Users are solely responsible for evaluating whether this software is suitable for
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Skill's behavior or capabilities extend beyond its stated purpose. Scope creep allows an agent to perform actions unrelated to its documented functionality, increasing the attack surface.

Scope Creep

Low
Category
Excessive Agency
Content
**USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.**

- The author(s) are NOT liable for any damages, losses, or consequences arising from 
  the use or misuse of this software — including but not limited to financial loss, 
  data loss, security breaches, business interruption, or any indirect/consequential damages.
- This software does NOT constitute financial, legal, trading, or professional advice.
- Users are solely responsible for evaluating whether this software is suitable for
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Skill's behavior or capabilities extend beyond its stated purpose. Scope creep allows an agent to perform actions unrelated to its documented functionality, increasing the attack surface.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The quick-start instructions tell users to install the template and remove the setup guide before clearly disclosing that the skill will cause the agent to process and persist user data in workspace files such as MEMORY.md, inbox/, and memory/. That is a transparency and informed-consent issue: users may deploy it before understanding its data-retention behavior, increasing the risk of storing sensitive information unintentionally.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding
The 'Minimalist' personality includes a fixed instruction of 'No emoji. Just answers,' which imposes a specific communication style on the agent. The policy allows locale/language constraints only when the user is given a choice or the constraint is justified, and this phrasing presents the restriction as part of the prescribed behavior.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.