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Security audit

sentisense

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a coherent read-only SentiSense market-data API integration that discloses its API-key and network use.

Install if you are comfortable giving the skill access to your SentiSense API key and sending market-data queries, watchlists, and screener criteria to SentiSense. Prefer direct REST calls; if you use an SDK, pin a reviewed version and avoid running it with unrelated secrets in the environment.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:1873
Finding
Unpinned Optional SDK Dependencies Permit Mutable Supply-Chain Code## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md:1873-1882` **Vulnerability Type**: Unpinned third-party package installation **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```markdown **Python:** [github.com/SentiSenseApp/sentisense](https://github.com/SentiSenseApp/sentisense) (`pip install sentisense`) ```python import os from sentisense import SentiSenseClient client = SentiSenseClient(api_key=os.environ["SENTISENSE_API_KEY"]) price = client.get_stock_price("AAPL") ``` **Node.js:** [github.com/SentiSenseApp/sentisense-node](https://github.com/SentiSenseApp/sentisense-node) (`npm install sentisense`) ``` ### Technical Analysis The documented `pip install sentisense` and `npm install sentisense` commands do not specify an audited package version, integrity hash, lockfile, or immutable source revision. Consequently, the installed artifact is selected from mutable package-registry state at installation time. Although the Skill advises users to review the source and describes the SDKs as optional, reviewing the linked repository does not ensure that the package subsequently downloaded from PyPI or npm corresponds to the reviewed code. A compromised publisher account, registry compromise, or malicious future release could therefore cause a user to install code that was not present during the Skill audit. Python and Node.js dependencies may execute code during installation, import, or normal API use. Because the examples pass `SENTISENSE_API_KEY` to the installed SDK, a compromised dependency could also access and exfiltrate that credential. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the package publisher, registry account, release pipeline, or a future package version. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious release under the legitimate `sentisense` package name. 3. A user follows the Skill's unversioned `pip install sentisense` or `npm install sentisense` instruction. 4. The package manager resolves and downl ...[truncated 1157 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Pin each SDK to a specifically audited release, for example: - `pip install sentisense==X.Y.Z` - `npm install sentisense@X.Y.Z` 2. For Python, publish and verify package hashes through a requirements file using `--require-hashes`. 3. For Node.js, provide a committed lockfile and use `npm ci` rather than unconstrained installation. 4. Link each recommended package release to an immutable source commit and document how users can verify that the registry artifact was built from that commit. 5. Prefer isolated virtual environments or containers with minimal filesystem access, restricted environment variables, and limited outbound networking. 6. Preserve direct HTTPS REST calls as the default integration path because they avoid executing an additional third-party SDK. 7. Advise users not to expose unrelated credentials to the SDK process and to rotate `SENTISENSE_API_KEY` if dependency compromise is suspected.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (1)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
| `limit` | int | No | 100 | Rows returned, capped at 500. Sits here, not inside `plan` |

```bash
curl -X POST "https://app.sentisense.ai/api/v1/screener/execute" \
  -H "X-SentiSense-API-Key: $SENTISENSE_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.