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Security audit

Skill Preflight

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This plugin has a coherent purpose, but its file path handling and install instructions create Review-level risk.

Review carefully before installing. Keep ollamaBaseUrl local unless you trust the remote host with prompts and indexed docs, do not put secrets in indexed Markdown, and avoid this version in shared or untrusted workspaces until path validation and the npm install-name mismatch are fixed.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (2)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
dist/index.js:216
Finding

Unrestricted Configured Paths Permit Reads Outside the Workspace

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
README.md:22
Finding

README Installation Command References a Different npm Package

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (9)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill is described as local-first and 'no API calls,' but the documentation explicitly allows configuring a remote Ollama host, which would send prompt text and full indexed markdown content off-machine. It also states that TOOLS.md and arbitrary pinned docs can be injected, making the behavior broader than the declared scope and increasing the chance that sensitive content is exposed or unexpected instructions are inserted into agent context.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 80)May include surrounding context.

md
- `skills/` — skill documentation (looks for `SKILL.md` in subdirs or loose `.md` files)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The plugin claims local-only/no-API-call behavior, but the embedding endpoint is fully configurable and embedText() sends both user prompt text and indexed document content to cfg.ollamaBaseUrl. Although there is a startup warning for non-local hosts, the code still permits remote transmission, creating a real confidentiality risk and a mismatch between advertised and actual behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

At prompt-build time, the plugin ranks documents by embedding the current prompt and document bodies, which means sensitive runtime context may be transmitted to the configured embedding host. In an agent skill whose purpose is preflight context injection, this network path materially expands data-exfiltration surface beyond what users would expect from a local indexing helper.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill performs network-capable behavior through calls to an Ollama HTTP endpoint, but the manifest does not declare an explicit tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. That creates a trust and review gap: operators may assume the skill is documentation-only or local-safe while it can transmit prompt and indexed document content over HTTP depending on configuration.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Skill Enumeration

Medium
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 108)May include surrounding context.

md
"plugins": {
    "skill-preflight": {
      "config": {
        "pinnedDocs": ["memory/protocols/house-rules.md", "skills/ethereum/SKILL.md"]
      }
    }
  }

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The inline description states that no external embedding API is required when Ollama is local, but the implementation still performs HTTP requests and can target a non-local host. This misleading assurance increases the chance operators will deploy the skill under false assumptions about data locality and privacy.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

Prompt text and document content are sent to a configurable embedding service during ranking, but user-facing disclosure is limited to a logger warning at startup and may not be seen by end users at the moment data is used. This is a genuine transparency and privacy control gap, especially because the transmitted data comes from both live prompts and workspace documentation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

This manifest description says the skill 'Injects relevant skills and protocols into OpenClaw agent context' but does not specify when that injection occurs, what conditions trigger it, or any exclusions. In a manifest file, this kind of broad behavioral description can create ambiguity about invocation scope and lead to unintended activation expectations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.