T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
SKILL.md:178- Finding
Overbroad Enumeration of Credential-Related Environment Variables
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This writing assistant is mostly coherent, but it asks for shell access and gives unsafe credential-checking and unclear data-flow instructions that users should review before installing.
Install only if you are comfortable with a writing skill that can use shell commands and may rely on external APIs or callbacks. Do not let it run broad environment-variable checks, and require confirmation before any command execution, network request, callback URL use, or handling of API keys and private drafts.
SKILL.md:178Overbroad Enumeration of Credential-Related Environment Variables
The document states that FREE-version data is stored locally and not uploaded, but elsewhere admits some features require network access and external APIs. This is a serious trust and privacy issue because users may share proprietary drafts, API keys, or confidential content under a false assumption that nothing leaves the machine.
The keyword list is excessively broad and overlaps with ordinary language such as writing, document, style, and editing. In agent ecosystems that auto-select skills from metadata, broad tags can cause unintended activation and expose user content to unnecessary tool execution or external transmission paths.
The skill enables the exec tool but does not prominently warn users in its description that shell commands may be run as part of fulfillment. Hidden command-execution capability is dangerous because users may provide untrusted content or assume a text-only assistant while the agent is actually permitted to invoke the local shell.
The input format supports callback URLs and the document also references external APIs, but there is no explicit warning that user content may be sent to third-party endpoints. This can lead to silent exfiltration of prompts, drafts, or metadata if an agent follows the documented workflow without informed consent.
The invocation guidance is broad enough that an agent could over-activate the skill for generic writing-related requests without clear boundaries. Over-broad triggering increases the chance that the skill will run tools, including exec or networked actions, on inputs the user did not intend to route through this skill.
The skill presents itself as local/basic while also declaring that some functionality may access external APIs and requires network connectivity. This mismatch can mislead users and host agents about data-flow and trust boundaries, causing sensitive writing prompts or documents to be sent off-host unexpectedly.
The visible display name, summary, and nearly all user-facing instructions are presented only in Chinese, while the skill is described as usable across multiple generic AI agent platforms and does not indicate that Chinese is optional or region-specific. This can be a language/locale policy issue because the skill does not offer users a language choice or opt-in.
No suspicious patterns detected.