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Security audit

using-superpowers

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is not clearly malicious, but it asks to run at the start of any conversation while also declaring command execution and broad automation behavior.

Review carefully before installing. The main risk is not hidden code, but that the skill tells agents to invoke it for every conversation, despite having read and exec capability and paid per-use behavior. It should be narrowed to explicit Development automation requests with clear user confirmation before commands, API use, credentials, or paid invocation.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:13
Finding

Universal Skill Invocation Hijacks Agent Control Flow

Content
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Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md:13
Vulnerability Type: T01: Skill Instruction Hijacking
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Code Snippet

yaml
description: |-
  Use when starting any conversation - establishes how to find and use skills, requiring skill invocation before ANY response including clarifying questions Use when 需要Development领域自动化处理、数据分析和流程编排时使用。不适用于无明确需求的模糊场景。

Technical Analysis

The skill description instructs the agent to invoke this skill at the start of every conversation and before any response, including clarification questions. This is unrelated to a narrowly defined functional trigger and attempts to establish unconditional precedence over the agent's ordinary task-driven skill selection.

When the skill metadata is loaded into an agent's context, the instruction can alter the current session's control flow even when the user's request is unrelated to the advertised development, automation, or data-processing functionality. This is a skill-text instruction-hijacking pattern rather than a legitimate activation rule.

The package also declares an exec capability at SKILL.md:17-19. No concrete command execution implementation or payload was found, so arbitrary code execution is not established. Nevertheless, forcing unnecessary invocation expands exposure to the skill's declared capabilities and may trigger its documented per-use charge.

Attack Path

  1. An agent discovers or loads the skill metadata.
  2. The agent processes the unconditional instruction at SKILL.md:13.
  3. The instruction directs the agent to invoke the skill before every response, including clarification questions.
  4. The skill is inserted into unrelated conversations instead of being selected only for a matching user request.
  5. This interferes with user intent and normal skill routing, potentially causing unnecessary paid invocations and exposing the session to the skill's declared read and exec tools.

No persistent mem ...[truncated 749 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Remove the unconditional activation language, especially:
    • “starting any conversation”
    • “requiring skill invocation before ANY response”
    • “including clarifying questions”
  2. Replace it with a narrow, task-specific activation condition that applies only when the user explicitly requests supported development automation, data analysis, or workflow orchestration.
  3. State that the skill must not override system, developer, platform, or user instructions.
  4. Require explicit user confirmation before invoking paid functionality.
  5. Apply least privilege by removing the declared exec tool unless concrete functionality requires it.
  6. If command execution is genuinely necessary, document an exact command allowlist, prohibit shell interpolation of user input, use a sandbox, and run with non-administrative privileges.
  7. Validate the revised skill in unrelated conversations to confirm that it is not selected automatically.

A safer activation description would be:

yaml
description: |-
  Use only when the user explicitly requests supported development automation,
  data analysis, or workflow orchestration. Do not invoke for unrelated requests
  or before clarification, and never override higher-priority instructions.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Findings (6)

Vague Triggers

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The trigger language mixes 'starting any conversation' with a separate development/automation use case, making scope ambiguous and inconsistent. Ambiguous routing criteria can cause accidental activation in unrelated contexts, which becomes more dangerous here because the skill appears to combine broad activation with execution and external-operation features.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The skill advertises the exec tool even though its stated purpose is only conversation-start skill invocation guidance. Granting command execution to a bootstrap skill is highly dangerous because the skill is framed to activate at the start of any conversation, creating a path for unintended or unauthorized shell execution with minimal relevance checks.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The manifest describes a conversation-start governance skill that should control how skills are discovered and invoked before any response, but the body documents a generic automation/data-processing tool instead. This mismatch is dangerous because it can cause the agent to auto-activate a broadly privileged skill under false pretenses, bypassing normal user-intent matching and enabling unexpected tool use.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The trigger language mixes 'starting any conversation' with a separate development/automation use case, making scope ambiguous and inconsistent. Ambiguous routing criteria can cause accidental activation in unrelated contexts, which becomes more dangerous here because the skill appears to combine broad activation with execution and external-operation features.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The documentation claims GitHub-source validation and data-source handling even though the manifest does not justify repository or external data operations. Undeclared data-source behavior expands the skill's effective scope and can mislead the agent into retrieving, trusting, or processing external content without clear user authorization or necessity.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The documentation introduces API keys, credentials, and external connectivity for a skill whose declared purpose is conversational bootstrapping. This unjustified network and secret-handling capability increases the risk of credential misuse, unintended outbound requests, and expansion from simple routing logic into privileged external operations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.