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Security audit

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Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This looks like a translation skill, but it asks for command execution and network diagnostics that are not needed for translation.

Install only if you are comfortable with a translation skill that can read and write requested files and that also declares command execution. For safer use, treat file translation as explicit only, confirm the output filename before writing, avoid overwriting originals, and do not allow the skill to run ping or other shell commands for translation tasks.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:42
Finding

Unnecessary Command-Execution Capability Violates Least Privilege

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 42–44; related declarations at lines 242 and 251
Vulnerability Type: Excessive tool permission
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

yaml
tools:
  - read
  - exec
  - write

Related command-execution declarations and instructions:

markdown
- **Classification**: MD+EXEC (pure Markdown instructions; some functions require exec command-line execution capability)
markdown
| Network error | Connection timed out or unreachable | Execute ping commands to test network connectivity, check firewall and proxy settings, then execute ping commands again and retry the command, referring to domestic alternatives |

Technical Analysis

The Skill's stated purpose is text and single-file translation. Language-model inference is sufficient for text translation, while file translation requires only narrowly scoped read and write access. Nevertheless, the Skill declares the general-purpose exec tool and explicitly directs the Agent to invoke command-line network diagnostics.

This violates the principle of least privilege because arbitrary command execution is broader than the permissions legitimately required for translation. It is also inconsistent with the statements at lines 54 and 238 that the Skill does not call an external translation API. No malicious command, command-injection payload, or remote payload retrieval was identified, so the finding concerns excessive capability rather than confirmed malicious execution.

Attack Path

  1. An Agent loads the Skill and grants the tools declared in its metadata.
  2. The Skill consequently receives exec capability despite translation not requiring it.
  3. A network error, whether genuine or incorrectly inferred, activates the troubleshooting instruction at line 251.
  4. The Agent runs command-line network diagnostics such as ping.
  5. Host command execution and network interactio ...[truncated 757 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Remove exec from the declared tool list:
    yaml
    tools:
      - read
      - write
    
  2. Change the MD+EXEC classification to a Markdown-only classification with narrowly scoped file access.
  3. Remove the ping troubleshooting instruction. Because the Skill uses the Agent's built-in LLM and no external translation API, network diagnostics are not part of its legitimate workflow.
  4. Restrict reads to the exact source file selected by the user.
  5. Restrict writes to a derived language-suffixed output path, require confirmation before overwriting an existing file, and reject path traversal outside the authorized workspace.
  6. If command execution is retained for an independently justified feature, use a strict command allowlist, prohibit shell interpretation, validate every argument, impose timeouts, and require explicit user approval before execution.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Findings (7)

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
81% confidence
Finding

The entire skill description and usage guidance are written only in Chinese, and there is no statement offering users a choice of interaction language or clarifying that Chinese is just an example locale. For a multilingual translation tool, this can be interpreted as imposing a specific language/locale without user opt-in.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The documentation says the tool works without calling an external translation API, which implies a self-contained or purely local translation workflow. However, the dependency section later states that an LLM API is required and that translation is provided by the agent's built-in LLM, so the actual behavior still relies on an external/model API service rather than being fully local or API-free.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The statement that the tool does not call an external translation API is contradicted by later lines declaring 'LLM API' as a required dependency and saying translation is provided by the agent's built-in LLM. This is not just incomplete documentation; it presents two conflicting descriptions of how translation is actually performed.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The skill claims to be a simple personal translation tool, but its documentation introduces generic create/query/modify/delete-style operational modes unrelated to translation. In an agent setting, this kind of overbroad capability framing can cause the agent to infer authority to perform unintended state-changing actions, increasing the risk of misuse or prompt-induced workspace modifications.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill describes reading a file and saving a translated output file, but it does not clearly warn that it will modify the workspace or require explicit consent before writing. In an agent environment with write access, this can lead to unintended file creation or overwrites, especially if triggered by ambiguous requests.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The trigger description says to use the skill whenever text translation, multilingual conversion, or localization is needed, without clearly defining boundaries, explicit trigger phrases, or exclusion examples beyond a generic capability statement. This broad wording could cause unintended invocation for many ordinary requests that mention language conversion or localization in passing.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

Adding exec-based network diagnostics like ping is unjustified for a personal translation skill and expands behavior beyond its stated purpose. In a tool-enabled agent, unnecessary shell/network instructions increase attack surface by normalizing command execution and could be abused for reconnaissance or environmental probing.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.