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Security audit

Ssl Toolkit Free

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This SSL helper is not malicious, but it needs review because its activation scope is contradictory while it can guide server-changing commands and persistent certificate renewal setup.

Install only if you intend to use it for SSL/TLS administration. Review each generated command before running it, back up web-server configs, prefer signed OS packages or official Certbot installation guidance over unpinned pip installs, and require explicit approval before editing cron or changing live certificate/server configuration.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:373
Finding

Unpinned Certbot Installation from a Mutable Package Repository

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, line 373
Vulnerability Type: Insecure third-party dependency installation
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

markdown
| certbot | Command-line tool | Recommended | `pip install certbot` or download from eff.org |

Technical Analysis

The Skill recommends installing Certbot through pip install certbot without pinning a reviewed version, locking transitive dependencies, verifying package hashes, or requiring an isolated environment. The command relies on the mutable default Python package repository and executes package installation logic with the privileges of the invoking user.

This does not establish that Certbot is malicious. The weakness is that the command implicitly trusts whichever release and dependency versions the package index resolves at execution time. A compromised publisher account, malicious dependency release, package-index compromise, or future dependency-chain incident could therefore introduce code that was not present during this audit.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises a relevant package publisher, release process, package-index account, or transitive dependency.
  2. The attacker publishes a malicious version that satisfies the unconstrained dependency resolution.
  3. A user or Agent follows the Skill's dependency instructions and runs pip install certbot.
  4. Pip downloads the current package and its resolved dependencies without checking them against a reviewed lock file or expected hashes.
  5. Malicious package code executes during installation or when Certbot is subsequently invoked.
  6. The payload operates with the permissions of the user running pip or Certbot.

Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation could permit arbitrary code execution with the invoking user's privileges. Because certificate administration is commonly performed by an administrator or root-equivalent account, the potential scope ma ...[truncated 355 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Prefer Certbot installation through the operating system's signed package repository or Certbot's current official installation procedure.
  2. If pip installation is required, create a dedicated virtual environment and avoid installing into a privileged system-wide Python environment.
  3. Pin Certbot and every transitive dependency to versions that have been reviewed and tested.
  4. Generate a lock file containing cryptographic hashes and install with hash enforcement, such as pip's --require-hashes option.
  5. Obtain packages only from an explicitly configured trusted index over TLS, and document the expected package publisher and source.
  6. Perform installation as an unprivileged account where possible. Grant only the narrowly required permissions for certificate deployment and renewal.
  7. Periodically update pinned versions through a controlled review process that includes provenance verification and vulnerability scanning.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Findings (5)

Vague Triggers

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The listed trigger condition is unrelated to the skill's actual function and is highly ambiguous, describing project-management scenarios instead of SSL administration. This makes activation scope unpredictable and can route unrelated requests into a skill that has read/write/exec capabilities, increasing the risk of unsafe command generation or configuration changes in the wrong context.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill declares automatic activation on broad keyword mentions such as SSL证书, HTTPS配置, Let's Encrypt, certbot, and TLS配置, then states it will output executable commands and configuration. Broad keyword-triggered activation increases the chance of unintended invocation in mixed conversations, leading an agent to suggest or run privileged commands or modify web-server settings without the user's clear intent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The markdown advertises modifying configurations and producing executable commands via exec-backed operations, but it does not clearly warn users about the risks of system changes, service disruption, certificate replacement, or command execution. In a skill with write and exec permissions, missing safety warnings and confirmation gates materially increase the chance of accidental destructive or persistent changes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The trigger-condition section says the skill should be used for project management, task planning, progress tracking, and team collaboration, which directly contradicts the rest of the SSL/TLS-focused skill. In an agent ecosystem, contradictory routing metadata can cause the skill to activate in unrelated contexts and then propose or execute system-level SSL commands where they were not intended.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 286)May include surrounding context.

certbot renew --dry-run

...

添加cron定时续期

crontab -e

每天凌晨检查并续期

0 0 * * * certbot renew --quiet

text