T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
SKILL.md:13- Finding
Excessive Agent Tool Permissions
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md:13-16
Vulnerability Type: Excessive command-execution and filesystem-write permissions
Risk Level: Mediumyaml tools: - read - exec - writeTechnical Analysis
The skill declares
read,exec, andwritecapabilities, but its documented workflow only requires inspecting files and returning an audit report. It defines no legitimate command-execution or filesystem-modification operation. Theexecandwritepermissions therefore exceed the task's functional requirements and violate the principle of least privilege.Because the skill analyzes potentially untrusted skill files, their contents may include adversarial instructions. If the hosting agent does not maintain a strict boundary between inspected content and trusted instructions, the unnecessary permissions could turn an instruction-handling failure into command execution or filesystem modification.
Attack Path
- An attacker creates a skill containing adversarial instructions disguised as content to be audited.
- A user asks this vetter to inspect the attacker's skill.
- The agent reads the hostile content as part of the required review.
- The content attempts to redirect the agent into invoking its available tools.
- If the agent fails to treat the inspected content strictly as untrusted data, the declared
execcapability can run local commands, whilewritecan create or modify accessible files.
This path depends on an instruction-boundary failure in the hosting agent; the declaration itself does not automatically execute commands.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation could permit arbitrary commands within the hosting agent's execution context and modification of files available to that context. The practical scope is limited by the operating-system identity, sandbox, workspace restrictions, and approval controls applied by the host platform. No evidenc ...[truncated 92 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Remove
execandwritefrom the declared tool list and retain onlyread. - If reports must be persisted, grant narrowly scoped write access to one explicit report directory rather than general write capability.
- Require explicit user approval before any command execution or file modification.
- Treat all reviewed skill content as untrusted data and prohibit instructions found in target files from changing the vetter's goals or invoking tools.
- Document the permitted file scope and prevent access outside the target skill directory unless separately authorized.
- Remove
