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Security audit

技能安全扫描(免费版)

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill appears to be a remote skill-scanning helper, but it requests broad local read, write, and command execution authority that is not well scoped to that purpose.

Review this skill before installing. It may be useful for checking registered AI skills, but install it only in a sandboxed agent profile or after the publisher narrows the permissions to a constrained web request, explains any API key requirement, and documents what scan identifiers are sent to scanner.pyxmate.com.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:13
Finding

Excessive Filesystem and Command-Execution Permissions

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 13-15
Vulnerability Type: Excessive tool permissions and violation of least privilege
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

yaml
tools:
  - read
  - exec
  - write

Technical Analysis

The Skill declares unrestricted filesystem reading, filesystem writing, and command execution. Its documented functionality only performs an HTTPS request to https://scanner.pyxmate.com/api/v1/check/ using a supplied owner/name identifier and processes the resulting security scores.

General-purpose read, write, and exec capabilities are not necessary for that operation. A constrained network-request capability restricted to the documented API host would be sufficient. Granting broader tools increases the authority available to the Skill and violates the principle of least privilege.

The Markdown does not directly instruct the Agent to abuse these tools, so exploitation would depend on the hosting Agent exposing the declared permissions and accepting malicious or misdirected instructions. Nevertheless, the unnecessary permissions materially increase the consequences of prompt injection, compromised context, or future malicious modifications to the Skill.

Attack Path

  1. A user loads the Skill on an Agent platform that grants the tools listed in its metadata.
  2. The Skill consequently receives filesystem read/write and shell-command execution capabilities.
  3. Attacker-controlled input, injected content, or a later malicious change directs the Agent to invoke one of those tools rather than only querying the scanner API.
  4. The read tool can be used to access files available to the Agent, including configuration or credential files.
  5. The write tool can alter files within the Agent process's operating-system permissions.
  6. The exec tool can execute arbitrary local commands under the Agent's account, potentially combining local data acce ...[truncated 658 chars]
Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions

  1. Remove read, write, and unrestricted exec from the declared tools.
  2. Replace them with a dedicated HTTP-request capability restricted to:
    • HTTPS only;
    • the exact host scanner.pyxmate.com;
    • the path prefix /api/v1/check/;
    • the required HTTP method, preferably GET;
    • bounded response sizes and reasonable timeouts.
  3. Validate owner and name against a strict allowlist pattern before constructing the request path, and URL-encode each path component.
  4. Do not permit arbitrary callback destinations unless callback support is implemented with strict URL validation and protections against server-side request forgery.
  5. If command execution is unavoidable on a platform lacking a network tool, use a fixed wrapper rather than a user-constructed shell command. Pass validated values as separate arguments and enforce an executable and destination allowlist.
  6. Explicitly disclose that the supplied skill identifier is sent to a third-party service.
  7. Remove the undocumented API_KEY configuration requirement unless authentication is genuinely required. If it is required, document the precise authentication mechanism and ensure the key is never placed in URLs, logs, command output, or scanner payloads.
  8. Enforce operating-system sandboxing, minimal filesystem access, blocked subprocess creation, and egress filtering as defense-in-depth controls.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (3)

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
83% confidence
Finding

The declared toolset includes read, write, and exec, but the user-facing description only presents curl/WebFetch-style remote scanning behavior. This mismatch can conceal materially broader local capabilities than necessary, increasing the risk that the skill could access local files or modify data under the guise of a simple API lookup.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill sends skill identifiers and potentially related metadata to a third-party scanner endpoint but does not clearly warn users that this transmission occurs or describe any privacy implications. In enterprise or private workflow contexts, even owner/name pairs and associated scan context can reveal internal projects, vendors, or security review activity to an external service.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The skill documentation instructs users to configure an API key even though the documented scan flow appears to use a public GET endpoint and does not explain what service the key authorizes. This can normalize unnecessary secret handling, cause users to expose credentials in an agent environment, and expand the skill’s effective privilege surface without clear need.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.