T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
SKILL.md:323- Finding
Sensitive Credential File Reconnaissance Through the Security Scan API
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is an operations dashboard guide with legitimate admin use, but it asks users to enable broad filesystem, secret-scanning, service-restart, and configuration-changing powers without enough scoping or safeguards.
Review this skill carefully before installing. Use it only in a controlled ops environment, keep the high-risk environment flags disabled unless needed, avoid enabling home-directory or arbitrary attachment copying, require redacted secret-scan results, restrict scan paths and restartable services, and add explicit approvals or dry-run previews before restore, terminate, config update, or restart operations.
SKILL.md:323Sensitive Credential File Reconnaissance Through the Security Scan API
SKILL.md:221Overbroad Attachment Copy Permissions Include Arbitrary and Home-Directory Files
SKILL.md:132Unpinned Express Installation Creates a Non-Reproducible Dependency Chain
Backup restore and config/model update operations can overwrite current state, change runtime behavior, or cause outages, yet the examples present them as routine actions without prominent risk disclosure. This is particularly dangerous for an exec-capable agent because configuration drift or rollback mistakes can immediately affect production systems.
The documented systemctl restart capability gives the skill host-control power that can disrupt or alter running services. For an agent skill, this is a privileged action beyond passive monitoring and can be abused to cause denial of service, hide activity by restarting components, or impact production workloads.
Restarting services is inherently disruptive and may interrupt production traffic, jobs, or monitoring coverage, but the documented example lacks a strong safety warning. In a skill that can be invoked through natural language, normalizing restart commands without safeguards materially raises accidental outage risk.
Explicitly scanning ./.env for patterns such as auth=, API_CRED, PASSPHRASE, and COOKIE is strong evidence of credential discovery behavior. In the context of an agent skill with command and file capabilities, this can directly expose secrets used by the host, applications, or connected services.
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"patterns": ["auth=", "API_CRED", "SENSITIVE", "PASSPHRASE", "COOKIE"],
"paths": ["./config", "./.env"]
}' \
http://localhost:3000/api/security/scan
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $DASHBOARD_AUTH" \
The file claims commands execute in a 'safe sandbox' while elsewhere documenting real file-sensitive and system-control operations. This mismatch can mislead users and downstream agents into underestimating the privileges and consequences of the skill, increasing the chance of unsafe execution.
The display name, summary, description, and the substantive user-facing instructions throughout the file are presented in Chinese, with no alternative language option or opt-in. This creates a language policy concern because the skill effectively requires a specific language for use without documenting that constraint or offering a choice.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
追踪AI Agent的用量消耗和API费用,设置预算阈值,超支时自动告警:
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $DASHBOARD_AUTH" \
http://localhost:3000/api/cost/summary
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $DASHBOARD_AUTH" \
http://localhost:3000/api/cost/by-session
The skill documents batch session archive/terminate operations without prominent warnings about impact on active work, data retention, or service continuity. In an agent-driven environment, terse examples can be executed literally, making accidental destructive actions more likely.
Documenting the loading of third-party provider API keys from a local keys.env file expands the skill's access to secret material unrelated to basic dashboard functionality. Even if intended for provider auditing, encouraging local secret-file ingestion increases the chance that an agent with file access will read, expose, or misuse those credentials.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
### 成本分析与预算管理
```bash
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $DASHBOARD_AUTH" \
http://localhost:3000/api/cost/summary
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $DASHBOARD_AUTH" \
"http://localhost:3000/api/cost/by-session?limit=50"
The skill exposes a 'sensitive data deep scan' workflow that explicitly targets local paths including ./.env and searches for credential-like patterns. In an agent context with read, write, and exec tools, this goes beyond ordinary dashboard monitoring and creates a clear mechanism to enumerate secrets from local files, which could then be disclosed, copied, or acted upon.