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Security audit

Office Task Automator Free

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This office automation skill appears legitimate, but it needs Review because it can process sensitive business documents with command execution while its privacy and dependency safeguards are incomplete.

Install only after reviewing whether its broad read/execute authority is acceptable for your documents. Use a dedicated virtual environment, pin and review dependencies, run on copies, specify exact input and output folders, preview batch file lists, and avoid sensitive HR, salary, ID, contract, or customer data unless you are comfortable with the agent platform's LLM data handling.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:76
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Python Package Installation

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
openpyxl== pdfdocx2pdf== pandas== ``` 2. Create a lockfile that includes all transitive dependencies and regenerate it only through a controlled dependency-review process. 3. Require cryptographic hash verification, such as a hash-pinned requirements file installed with: ```bash python -m pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt ``` 4. Configure an approved package index or internal artifact repository and disable fallback to untrusted indexes. 5. Install dependencies inside a dedicated, non-privileged virtual environment or sandbox. Do not install them as an administrator or root user. 6. Verify that `pdfdocx2pdf` is the intended package and review its source, maintainership, release history, and transitive dependencies before approval. 7. Run dependency vulnerability, provenance, and malware scanning as part of release validation. 8. Separate dependency provisioning from normal skill execution. A trusted administrator or build pipeline should prepare a reviewed runtime image before the skill processes user documents. 9. Restrict the agent's filesystem and network access during document processing according to least-privilege principles. ]]>
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (6)

Vague Triggers

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The capability coverage section enumerates very broad scene keywords and catch-all language such as using the skill whenever file handling or content extraction is needed. In combination with read and exec tool access, this can cause the agent to match far beyond intended office tasks, increasing the risk of processing unrelated sensitive files or executing unsafe transformations without clear user intent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill claims that all data is processed locally and never uploaded, but later states that it depends on a platform-hosted LLM API and even names a remote model route. This can mislead users into providing sensitive HR, contract, and customer data under a false privacy assumption, causing unintended disclosure to external services.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The skill promotes automated batch generation, conversion, merging, splitting, and cleaning of business documents without placing a prominent upfront warning about modification risk, overwrite risk, or sensitive-record handling. In this context, users may run high-impact operations on HR, attendance, contract, or customer files without realizing originals or confidential data could be affected.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill is activated by generic natural-language office requests without narrow trigger boundaries, while also being allowed to read files and execute commands. In an agent setting, this broad scope raises the chance of unintended invocation on sensitive directories or ambiguous user requests, leading to overbroad file access or destructive batch actions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The license section explicitly states the skill was '完全中文化表达,适配中文办公场景', which indicates a fixed language/locale orientation. There is no accompanying opt-in, language choice, or clear documentation that the skill is intended only for a China-specific compliance or regional use case.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

L374 说明免费版“不提供HR/财务/销售/行政/运营等多角色场景指南”。然而前文 L229-L286 已明确给出“HR专员”“行政助理”“销售助理”三类角色场景,这属于文档层面的直接自相矛盾。

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.