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Security audit

P2P通讯入门工具

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This P2P chat skill is mostly communication-focused, but it asks for exec/write authority while using overly broad coding and deployment trigger language that does not match its documented features.

Review before installing. Use this only for explicit P2P messaging or file-transfer tasks, install dependencies in an isolated environment, avoid elevated pip installs, and confirm receive paths and history/key storage behavior before exchanging sensitive files or messages.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:136
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Python Dependencies

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, line 136
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependencies installed from an implicitly selected package index
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code:

bash
# Dependency installation
pip install aiohttp cryptography

Technical Analysis

The documented installation command resolves aiohttp, cryptography, and their transitive dependencies without fixed versions or package-integrity hashes. Consequently, installations are not reproducible, and the code installed during a future Skill invocation may differ from the code available when the Skill was audited.

The command also relies on pip's configured package index without documenting or enforcing an approved source. If a dependency release, transitive dependency, package index, or local pip index configuration is compromised, an attacker-controlled package could be selected and installed. Python packages can execute code during installation or when subsequently imported.

There is no evidence in the audited project that the currently named packages are malicious. The vulnerability is the unsafe and mutable dependency-resolution process.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises a future release or transitive dependency of a named package, or influences the package index used by pip.
  2. A user or Agent follows the instructions in SKILL.md and runs pip install aiohttp cryptography.
  3. Pip resolves the unpinned dependency to the attacker-controlled or compromised release because no reviewed version or integrity hash is enforced.
  4. Malicious package code executes during installation or when the package is imported by the intended application.
  5. The payload operates with the permissions and environmental access of the account running pip or the application.

Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation could provide arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the installing user. Depe ...[truncated 619 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Move direct and transitive dependencies into a reviewed lock file with exact versions.
  2. Generate and enforce cryptographic hashes for every resolved distribution, for example:
    bash
    python3 -m pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt
    
  3. Use a trusted, explicitly configured package index or an internally controlled package mirror rather than relying on ambient pip configuration.
  4. Review packages before updating the lock file and use automated dependency and vulnerability scanning.
  5. Install dependencies in an isolated virtual environment under a non-privileged account.
  6. Avoid sudo pip install and other elevated installation methods.
  7. Document a controlled dependency-update process so new releases are reviewed before deployment.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (6)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The manifest presents the skill as a P2P/WebRTC communication tool, but the description simultaneously advertises broad code-generation, debugging, and deployment use cases that are unrelated to the documented functionality. This scope mismatch can cause the agent to invoke a networked, file-capable skill in contexts where a user expected a programming assistant, increasing the chance of unintended command execution, data handling, or misuse of the skill's exec/write capabilities.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The trigger language is overly broad, including generic requests like code generation, programming assistance, debugging, testing, and deployment. Broad activation criteria are dangerous in agent systems because they can cause selection of a skill with exec, write, and network-facing behavior for unrelated tasks, expanding attack surface and enabling unintended side effects.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The capability coverage statement claims the skill supports coding assistance, debugging, testing, and deployment scenarios, but the rest of the file only documents messaging, signaling, encryption, and file transfer operations. Overstating capability coverage broadens when the skill may be selected, which is dangerous because this skill exposes exec/write/network behaviors unrelated to those claimed scenarios.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The documentation internally contradicts itself by claiming software-development and deployment assistance coverage while all commands and examples are communication-only. Such contradictory instructions create unsafe routing ambiguity for agents, making it more likely the skill is invoked outside its true domain and performs unexpected network or local-file actions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The capability scope lists an extremely broad mix of keywords, including unrelated software-engineering scenarios, making invocation boundaries unclear. In an agent environment, unclear boundaries can be exploited indirectly through prompt shaping to trigger a powerful skill outside its intended purpose, especially one that can execute commands and write files.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The examples instruct file transfer and message-history operations that imply local writes and persistent storage, but they do not prominently warn users about where files are saved, how history is retained, or the privacy/security implications of receiving untrusted files. In a communication tool, this is more dangerous because users may exchange external content and persist sensitive data locally without informed consent or validation steps.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.