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Security audit

CellCog音乐生成免费版

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill mostly documents CellCog music generation, but it advertises unrelated uses and recommends weak API-key storage.

Review this before installing. Use it only for CellCog music generation, avoid sending confidential lyrics or proprietary prompts unless you accept CellCog handling them, and prefer an environment variable or OS credential store over the plaintext config-file example. The publisher should narrow the trigger text and remove unrelated video, code, and conversion claims.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:199
Finding

Plaintext API Key Storage Without Permission Hardening

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 199–202
Vulnerability Type: Plaintext sensitive credential storage
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

bash
# Configure API Key
export CELLCOG_API_KEY="your-api-key-here"
# ...
# Or write it to a configuration file
echo '{"api_key": "your-api-key"}' > ~/.cellcog/config.json

The plaintext configuration format is also demonstrated at lines 237–244:

json
// ~/.cellcog/config.json
{
  "api_key": "your-api-key",
  "default_style": "pop",
  "default_duration": 30,
  "default_format": "mp3",
  "default_quality": "standard"
}

Technical Analysis

The documented setup permits a CellCog API key to be written unencrypted to a predictable file, ~/.cellcog/config.json. The instructions do not require restrictive directory or file permissions and do not recommend an operating-system credential store.

Consequently, the file's effective access controls depend on the user's environment, current umask, and any pre-existing directory permissions. The shell redirection operator also overwrites an existing configuration file without warning. Although the example contains a placeholder, users are instructed to configure an actual API key using this mechanism.

Attack Path

  1. A user follows the setup instructions and replaces the placeholder with a valid CellCog API key.
  2. The shell writes that credential in plaintext to ~/.cellcog/config.json.
  3. The file is created with permissions derived from the current environment, without explicit access restrictions.
  4. Another local user, process, compromised backup, or accidentally exposed archive obtains the configuration file.
  5. The attacker extracts the key and submits authenticated requests to the CellCog API.

This exploitation path requires access to the configuration file through permissive local permissions, another compromised process operating in the user's context, or disclosure through backups or archives.

Impact Ass

...[truncated 618 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

Prefer injecting the API key through a protected environment at runtime or storing it in an operating-system credential manager rather than a plaintext configuration file.

If file-based storage is necessary:

  1. Create the configuration directory with mode 0700.
  2. Set a restrictive umask before creating the file.
  3. Set the configuration file mode to 0600.
  4. Avoid silently overwriting existing configuration.
  5. Ensure the file is excluded from source control, diagnostic bundles, logs, and unencrypted backups.
  6. Never print the real API key in command output.
  7. Document key rotation and immediate revocation procedures.

A hardened file-creation example is:

bash
install -d -m 700 ~/.cellcog
umask 077
printf '%s\n' '{"api_key":"REPLACE_SECURELY"}' > ~/.cellcog/config.json
chmod 600 ~/.cellcog/config.json

For stronger protection, replace file-based storage with the platform keychain or a dedicated secret-management service.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (8)

Vague Triggers

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The trigger keywords include broad terms like API design, code generation, automation, conversion, design, and video, which are unrelated to music generation. Overbroad triggers are dangerous because they can cause the skill to activate in many unrelated contexts, potentially exfiltrating user prompts or steering workflows toward an external service unnecessarily.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The capability-scope keywords are excessively broad and ambiguous, claiming coverage for many unrelated scenarios. In an agent environment, this increases the likelihood of unintended invocation and inappropriate handling of prompts or files that fall outside the skill's true purpose.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill is nominally for music generation, but its description claims unrelated capabilities such as video processing, dubbing, API design, and code generation. Overstating scope is dangerous because it can cause incorrect routing or activation in contexts where the skill lacks the controls, logic, or disclosures needed for those tasks.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The description says the skill is not applicable to copyright-protected media, yet it simultaneously advertises video/audio editing, media conversion, and dubbing scenarios that imply handling user-supplied media. This mismatch can mislead an agent or user about permitted scope and safety boundaries, increasing the chance the skill is invoked for prohibited media-processing tasks.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
63% confidence
Finding

The natural-language description is primarily in Chinese, but the activation guidance embeds English terms like “Use when” and English/Chinese mixed trigger keywords without indicating user language preference or offering a choice. This can amount to a language-policy issue because invocation behavior appears to privilege a specific mixed locale rather than respecting user opt-in.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs sending user-provided prompts or lyrics, along with an API credential, to an external service at api.cellcog.com. External transmission is expected for SaaS-backed skills, but it remains security-relevant because user data may leave the local environment and there is no clear data-handling disclosure, minimization guidance, or consent boundary.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 57)May include surrounding context.

bash
# 基础文生音乐
curl -X POST https://api.cellcog.com/v1/music/generate \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $CELLCOG_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs sending user-provided prompts or lyrics, along with an API credential, to an external service at api.cellcog.com. External transmission is expected for SaaS-backed skills, but it remains security-relevant because user data may leave the local environment and there is no clear data-handling disclosure, minimization guidance, or consent boundary.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 57)May include surrounding context.

bash
# 基础文生音乐
curl -X POST https://api.cellcog.com/v1/music/generate \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $CELLCOG_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The capability-coverage statement asserts support for all description keywords, including unrelated media-processing and software-development scenarios, even though the body only documents music generation. This creates a deceptive scope expansion that can cause unsafe or unintended invocation outside the skill's real control boundaries.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.