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Security audit

Monad开发工具

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This Monad development skill is mostly purpose-aligned, but it includes transaction broadcasting with a private key and third-party contract verification without enough warning or scoping.

Review this skill before installing if you work with real wallets or proprietary contracts. Use testnet-only keys, avoid production private keys on command lines, confirm every deploy or broadcast step manually, and only run the verification POST if you are comfortable sending contract build metadata and source-related JSON to the listed external service.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (5)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding
The activation description is extremely broad, covering generic coding help, debugging, testing, and deployment. In an agent environment with read/exec/write tools, vague routing criteria can cause the skill to activate for requests outside Monad-specific scope, increasing the chance of unnecessary command execution or handling sensitive development tasks without explicit user intent.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding
The usage guidance describes broad scenarios like deployment and on-chain building without meaningful constraints or approval boundaries. Because the skill exposes execution capability, ambiguous trigger language can lead to overuse in contexts where users expected advice only, potentially causing unintended filesystem changes, network calls, or blockchain actions.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding
The deployment example instructs broadcasting a transaction with a private key but does not place a direct warning at the step about real asset risk, irreversible on-chain effects, or key-handling precautions. In a blockchain deployment skill, omission of this warning materially increases the chance that users run the command blindly with production credentials.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Confidence
81% confidence
Finding
The verification step sends contract address, contract name, compiler version, and standard JSON input to an external service without a clear disclosure at that point. While contract verification is often expected, users may not realize build metadata and source-related inputs are being transmitted to a third party, creating avoidable privacy and supply-chain trust concerns.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
STANDARD_INPUT=$(forge verify-contract <TOKEN_ADDRESS> src/MyToken.sol:MyToken --chain 10143 --show-standard-json-input)
COMPILER_VERSION=$(jq -r '.metadata | fromjson | .compiler.version' out/MyToken.sol/MyToken.json)
# ...
curl -X POST https://agents.devnads.com/v1/verify \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d "{
    \"chainId\": 10143,
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
curl -X POST https://agents.devnads.com/v1/verify \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d

VirusTotal

VirusTotal findings are pending for this skill version.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.