T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
SKILL.md:62- Finding
Overbroad Default Access to Sensitive Agent Memory and Configuration
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md:62-72andSKILL.md:241
Vulnerability Type: Excessive access to sensitive Agent state
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Instruction Snippet
The following is a faithful English rendering of the audited instructions:
markdown 3. Comprehensive scan scope - MEMORY.md: long-term memory file - memory/*.md: daily logs - Workspace configuration files: AGENTS.md, SOUL.md, USER.md, TOOLS.md, HEARTBEAT.md, GUARDRAILS.md, IDENTITY.md, BOOTSTRAP.md - Supports scanning a specified file through the --file parameter 4. Automatic LLM provider detection - Prefer OpenAI for remote analysis - Fall back to Anthropic if available - Remote LLM analysis is disabled by default and requires --allow-remote - Remote mode transmits redacted contentLine 241 reiterates that all of these files are included in the default scan.
Technical Analysis
The Skill instructs the Agent to scan long-term memory, daily logs, user information, identity definitions, tool configuration, operational instructions, and security guardrails by default. These files can contain private conversations, behavioral rules, credentials, internal endpoints, security constraints, and other sensitive operational data.
This violates least-privilege principles because a general scan does not require every sensitive Agent configuration file to be collected automatically. A safer design would require the user to select files or approve a manifest before access.
Remote analysis is opt-in through
--allow-remote, which reduces automatic exposure. Nevertheless, enabling it may transmit information derived from all selected files to an external LLM provider. The package contains onlySKILL.md; no implementation is supplied to verify the claimed credential detection, redaction, file selection, or outbound-data controls.Attack Path
- A user installs or loads the ...[truncated 1350 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Default to scanning only a file explicitly selected by the user.
- Present the complete file manifest and obtain confirmation before reading multiple files.
- Exclude
USER.md,IDENTITY.md,TOOLS.md,GUARDRAILS.md, and similar sensitive files unless individually approved. - Apply path canonicalization and restrict scanning to an approved workspace root.
- Before remote analysis, display the exact destination, provider, model, files included, and a preview of the redacted payload.
- Implement deterministic local redaction for secrets and personal data before any network request.
- Fail closed if redaction cannot be completed or validated.
- Provide a local-only mode that technically prevents network access rather than relying solely on documentation.
- Add executable tests demonstrating that excluded files and detected credentials are never transmitted.
