T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:83- Finding
Unverified Remote Installer Piped Directly into a Shell
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md:83
Vulnerability Type: Remote payload retrieval and execution
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code
bash curl -fsSL https://ollama.com/install.sh | shTechnical Analysis
The installation instructions download a mutable script from an external URL and immediately execute it with
sh. The command does not pin an installer version, validate a cryptographic checksum or signature, or give the user an opportunity to inspect the downloaded content before execution.Installing Ollama is relevant to the Skill's declared local-embedding functionality, and the referenced domain is consistent with that dependency. However, direct network-to-shell execution is not the minimum privilege or safest installation mechanism. The effective code can change after the Skill has been reviewed, while the downloaded script receives all privileges available to the invoking user. If the command is run with elevated privileges, the script receives those elevated privileges as well.
No evidence in the audited artifact establishes that the remote installer is itself malicious. The confirmed vulnerability is the unsafe, unverified remote execution mechanism.
Attack Path
- A user or enabled Agent follows the quick-start instructions.
curlrequests the current contents ofhttps://ollama.com/install.sh.- An attacker compromises or maliciously alters the origin, hosting infrastructure, delivery pipeline, DNS/TLS trust path, or future installer contents.
- The altered response is streamed directly to
sh. - The shell executes the attacker-controlled commands without local integrity verification or prior inspection.
- The payload acts with the invoking user's permissions and may modify files, read accessible data, install additional components, or establish persistence.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation permits arbitrary command execution under the ...[truncated 594 chars]
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
-
Remove the
curl ... | shinstallation pattern. -
Prefer an official operating-system package manager or a signed, version-pinned release package.
-
If a standalone installer is necessary, separate download, verification, inspection, and execution:
bash curl -fL -o ollama-install.sh "https://ollama.com/install.sh" printf '%s %s\n' "<PUBLISHED_SHA256>" "ollama-install.sh" | sha256sum --check - less ollama-install.sh sh ollama-install.sh -
Publish the expected checksum through an independent, trusted release channel. A checksum fetched from the same mutable location does not adequately protect against origin compromise.
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Where available, verify a maintainer signature in addition to the checksum.
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Pin a specific release rather than retrieving a moving installer endpoint.
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Require explicit user confirmation before installation and clearly document whether elevated privileges are needed.
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Run installation with the least-privileged account possible; do not recommend
sudounless a specific operation requires it. -
Document the files, services, users, network listeners, and other system changes the installer is expected to create so users can assess its privilege requirements.
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