T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
SKILL.md:35- Finding
Excessive and Underspecified Tool Permissions
- Content
View full analysis
Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 35–39
Vulnerability Type: Excessive tool permissions and violation of least privilege
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
yaml tools: - read - exec - glob - grepRelated capability claims at lines 255–258:
markdown - **文件处理**: 支持多种文件格式的读取、解析和写入操作 - **API集成**: 通过标准化接口调用外部服务并处理响应 - **命令执行**: 在安全沙箱中执行系统命令并收集结果 - **信息检索**: 快速搜索和过滤目标数据In English, these lines claim support for file processing, external API integration, system-command execution in a sandbox, and information retrieval.
Technical Analysis
The Skill's stated primary purpose is to transform supplied conversation content into structured, Notion-compatible documentation. This text-transformation task does not inherently require arbitrary operating-system command execution or broad filesystem discovery.
Nevertheless, the Skill requests
exec,read,glob, andgrep. It does not define:- Allowed commands or arguments
- Permitted filesystem roots
- User-consent requirements for local-file access
- Network destination restrictions
- Isolation or sandbox enforcement
- Separation between trusted Skill instructions and untrusted transcript content
Because conversation transcripts are attacker-controllable input, embedded instructions could attempt to induce a tool-enabled agent to inspect unrelated files or execute commands. The reviewed package does not itself contain an exploit command or executable implementation, so exploitation depends on how the host agent interprets the Skill and exposes its declared tools.
The claim that commands run in a secure sandbox is not backed by any implementation or enforceable policy in the reviewed project. Similarly, the automatic sensitive-information filtering claim at line 194 has no corresponding code or concrete enforcement instructions.
Attack Path
- A user or attacker supplies a meeting ...[truncated 1532 chars]
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Remove
exec,glob,grep, and unrestrictedreadif the Skill only transforms explicitly supplied text. - Make the
contentparameter the sole default input source and treat its contents strictly as untrusted data, not agent instructions. - If local-file input is necessary, require explicit user selection and confirmation for each path, canonicalize paths, and restrict access to a dedicated workspace.
- If command execution is indispensable, define a minimal allowlist of fixed commands and arguments. Reject shell metacharacters, command substitution, redirection, and attacker-controlled executable paths.
- Enforce sandboxing in the host configuration rather than merely claiming it in documentation. Use a non-privileged account, read-only mounts where possible, minimal environment variables, and disabled network access by default.
- Add prompt-injection defenses requiring the agent to ignore operational instructions found inside transcripts or documents.
- Restrict external communication to explicitly approved domains and require user confirmation before transmitting document content.
- Remove or qualify claims about automatic sensitive-data filtering until an implemented, tested redaction mechanism exists.
- Add security tests covering transcript-based tool injection, path traversal, access to files outside the workspace, command injection, and accidental inclusion of secrets in generated output.
- Remove