T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
SKILL.md:25- Finding
Excessive command-execution and filesystem-write permissions
- Content
View full analysis
Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 25–28; corroborating functionality at lines 327–331
Vulnerability Type: Excessive tool permissions and violation of least privilege
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
yaml tools: - read - exec - writeThe broad permissions are reinforced by the following declarations at lines 327–331:
markdown ## 功能介绍 - **自动化执行**: 格式化/校验/压缩JSON并提取路径,提升可读性。Format, validate, compress JSON dat - **文件处理**: 支持多种文件格式的读取、解析和写入操作 - **API集成**: 通过标准化接口调用外部服务并处理响应 - **命令执行**: 在安全沙箱中执行系统命令并收集结果Technical Analysis
The Skill declares unrestricted
execandwritecapabilities despite its stated purpose being to format, validate, compress, and inspect JSON. Those operations can normally be performed in memory and do not inherently require arbitrary system-command execution or unrestricted filesystem modification.No command allowlist, destination-path restriction, domain restriction, or mandatory user-confirmation boundary is defined. If the hosting Agent grants the declared tools, the Skill therefore receives capabilities beyond the minimum privileges required for its core functionality.
The document also presents generic command execution and external API integration as supported features. This broadens the operational scope without defining how commands, arguments, files, or destinations are validated. The audit did not find an explicit instruction that directly interpolates untrusted JSON into a shell command, so exploitation depends on the hosting Agent being induced to exercise these overly broad tools.
The command at line 221:
bash curl -s https://api.example.com/data | python -m json.tooldoes not constitute remote payload execution: downloaded data is passed to Python's standard JSON parser rather than to a shell. It nevertheless demonstrates optional network access that is unnecessary for processing JSON supplied directl ...[truncated 1731 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Remove
execandwritefrom the declared tools for ordinary in-memory JSON formatting, validation, compression, statistics, and path extraction. - Retain only the minimum input-reading capability needed by the hosting platform.
- If file output is an essential optional feature, require an explicit user-selected destination and constrain writes to a dedicated workspace directory. Reject traversal, symlink escapes, absolute paths, and overwriting without confirmation.
- If command execution must remain available, replace generic
execaccess with a narrow wrapper that invokes only a fixed JSON parser, passes content through standard input, avoids shell interpretation, and enforces input-size, timeout, and resource limits. - Require explicit user approval before any network request, display the destination domain, and prohibit transmitting JSON that may contain secrets unless the user knowingly authorizes it.
- Remove or narrow the generic API-integration and command-execution claims at lines 330–331 so the documented capabilities match the Skill's declared JSON-processing purpose.
- Replace the placeholder
curlexample with a clearly user-controlled endpoint and state that local parsing is the default. Avoid silent network behavior. - Enforce sandboxing, outbound-network restrictions, filesystem isolation, and environment-variable filtering at the Agent platform level as defense in depth.
- Remove
