T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
SKILL.md:15- Finding
Excessive Command Execution and Filesystem Permissions
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 15-18; related scope expansion at lines 308-309
Vulnerability Type: Excessive tool permissions and violation of least privilege
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code Snippet:
yaml tools: - read - exec - writeThe document also expands the skill's scope at lines 308-309 to include generic batch file processing and environment or deployment management. These operations are not necessary for the stated meeting-automation purpose.
Technical Analysis
The skill requests unrestricted command execution together with file-read and file-write capabilities. A meeting assistant may need narrowly scoped access to meeting configuration and transcript storage, but the documented functionality does not establish a legitimate requirement for general host command execution or broad filesystem access.
This violates the principle of least privilege. Meeting links, participant speech, transcripts, callback data, and other meeting content are potentially attacker-controlled inputs. If an agent interprets malicious content as actionable instructions, the unnecessary
exec,read, andwritepermissions provide the capabilities needed to affect the host rather than limiting the resulting action to meeting operations.The package contains only documentation and does not include an implementation demonstrating direct exploitation. Therefore, the risk arises from the declared permission model and depends on how the hosting agent exposes and authorizes these tools.
Attack Path
- A user invokes the skill to join or process a meeting.
- An attacker supplies crafted content through a meeting invitation, meeting chat, spoken transcript, callback response, or other input processed by the agent.
- The crafted content attempts to induce the agent to read local files, execute a system command, or modify files.
- Because the skill declares
read,exec, a ...[truncated 970 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Remove the
execpermission unless a concrete meeting operation cannot be implemented through a narrowly scoped meeting-platform API. - Replace broad
readandwriteaccess with access limited to explicit configuration and transcript directories. - Remove unrelated batch-file, environment-management, and deployment-management capabilities from the skill specification.
- Require explicit user confirmation before joining a meeting, recording or transcribing audio, saving records, transmitting data, or invoking any external callback.
- Treat meeting links, chat messages, speech transcripts, participant names, API responses, and callback content as untrusted data rather than executable instructions.
- If command execution remains necessary, enforce a fixed command allowlist, structured arguments, shell-free process invocation, strict timeouts, and an isolated low-privilege sandbox.
- Block access to credentials, home directories, SSH material, cloud configuration, and unrelated project files through filesystem allowlists.
- Validate callback destinations with an HTTPS-only allowlist and block loopback, link-local, private-network, and cloud metadata addresses.
- Add audit logging for tool invocations while redacting meeting content, credentials, access tokens, and other sensitive information.
- Remove the