T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
SKILL.md:14- Finding
Excessive System Tool Permissions for a Jira Integration Skill
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md:14-17
Vulnerability Type: Excessive tool permissions and violation of least privilege
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
yaml tools: - read - exec - writeTechnical Analysis
The skill requests general-purpose file-reading, file-writing, and command-execution capabilities even though its documented purpose is to interact with Jira through an external API. These system-level capabilities are not demonstrably necessary for issue creation, status synchronization, or Jira workflow operations.
The document later claims that commands run in a sandbox and recommends command allowlisting, but it does not define enforceable command restrictions, filesystem path boundaries, executable allowlists, or user-confirmation requirements. No implementation is included that would allow these claimed safeguards to be verified.
Granting
exec,read, andwritetogether creates a broad capability set:readmay expose configuration files, credentials, source code, or other local data.writemay modify project files, configuration, or agent-accessible state.execmay invoke local programs with the privileges of the hosting agent.- Combining the tools can permit data discovery, modification, and command execution outside the legitimate Jira-integration scope.
This is a least-privilege failure rather than evidence of an embedded malicious payload. The reviewed file contains no specific malicious command, but its permission declaration unnecessarily expands the impact of malicious, ambiguous, or prompt-injected input.
Attack Path
- The Agent loads the skill and grants the declared
read,write, andexectools. - An attacker supplies a crafted instruction through a user request, Jira-derived content, or other untrusted context processed by the Agent.
- The crafted instruction induces the Agent to interpret unrelated local file acc ...[truncated 1506 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Remove
exec,read, andwritefrom the skill unless each capability is strictly required and supported by an implemented use case. - Replace general-purpose system tools with a dedicated Jira API interface exposing only required operations, such as:
- Creating an issue.
- Reading an explicitly identified issue.
- Applying an allowed transition.
- Updating an allowlisted set of fields.
- Restrict network access to explicitly configured Jira HTTPS origins and reject user-supplied hosts, schemes, or redirect targets.
- Enforce project, tenant, issue, transition, and field allowlists at the tool boundary rather than relying on natural-language instructions.
- If file access is genuinely required, confine it to a dedicated workspace directory, reject path traversal and symbolic-link escapes, and separate read-only from writable locations.
- If command execution is unavoidable, expose fixed operations instead of a shell. Do not concatenate user-controlled values into commands; use structured argument arrays and an executable allowlist.
- Require explicit user confirmation before issue creation, status transitions, destructive updates, or any local side effect.
- Apply output redaction and prevent API keys, environment variables, authorization headers, and sensitive Jira fields from entering logs or model-visible responses.
- Add an auditable implementation and automated security tests demonstrating that sandbox, authorization, path, command, and destination restrictions are enforced.
- Remove