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Security audit

深度研究工具

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This research/reporting skill is not malicious, but it asks for shell-command, file, API, and network-oriented authority without clear limits, so users should review it before installing.

Install only in an isolated workspace or virtual environment, review every command before execution, avoid giving it sensitive research topics or credentials, and prefer pinned dependency versions. Treat file writing, outbound searches/API calls, and shell execution as actions that should require explicit user approval.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:147
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Python Dependencies

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md:147 and repeated at SKILL.md:333-335
Vulnerability Type: Supply-chain risk caused by unpinned dependencies
Risk Level: Medium

bash
pip install requests beautifulsoup4 markdown

The dependency table repeats the same installation pattern:

bash
pip install requests
pip install beautifulsoup4
pip install markdown

Technical Analysis

The installation instructions do not pin package versions or require verified artifact hashes. Consequently, each installation resolves whatever package versions the configured Python package index currently considers suitable.

This makes the installed environment non-reproducible and exposes users to upstream supply-chain events. If a listed package, one of its transitive dependencies, the selected package index, or the user's package-index configuration is compromised, following these instructions could install attacker-controlled code.

Python packages may execute build-system or installation-related code during installation. Malicious package code can also execute later when the installed module is imported. The audit did not establish that the currently published packages are malicious; the confirmed weakness is that the skill provides no version or integrity controls against future or index-dependent changes.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises a listed package, one of its transitive dependencies, or a package index used by the target environment.
  2. The attacker publishes a malicious release that remains compatible with the unconstrained package requirement.
  3. A user follows the skill's documented pip install command.
  4. pip resolves and downloads the attacker-controlled release because no approved version or artifact hash is specified.
  5. Malicious code executes during package installation, package build processing, or a subsequent import.
  6. The payload operates with the permissions o ...[truncated 782 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Replace unconstrained package names with reviewed, exact versions, for example:
    text
    requests==<reviewed-version>
    beautifulsoup4==<reviewed-version>
    markdown==<reviewed-version>
    
  2. Maintain dependencies in a lock file generated by a tool such as pip-tools, Poetry, or another reproducible dependency manager.
  3. Require artifact hashes by installing with a hash-locked requirements file:
    bash
    python -m pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt
    
  4. Pin and review transitive dependencies, not only the three direct dependencies.
  5. Install inside an isolated virtual environment rather than the system Python environment, and do not use administrator or root privileges.
  6. Use only an explicitly configured, trusted package index over HTTPS. Prevent unintended fallback to untrusted extra indexes.
  7. Add automated dependency auditing and controlled update review. Regenerate locks and hashes only after validating new releases.
  8. Update all repeated installation examples at SKILL.md:333-335 so they do not encourage bypassing the locked installation process.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (6)

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The description explicitly states '支持中文交互' while the document does not clearly present language choice as an opt-in policy. Since locale/language constraints apply across all file types, this can be a policy violation if the skill defaults to or mandates a specific language without user choice.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

Lines L070-L073 explicitly state that research knowledge-base storage is not supported. Later, L372 says the skill supports reading, parsing, and writing multiple file formats, which directly conflicts with the earlier limitation because persistent writing/storage is presented as supported functionality.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The trigger condition '需要SEO优化、关键词分析、排名提升、搜索流量优化时使用' is broad enough to activate the skill in many loosely related contexts. Overbroad invocation criteria can cause an agent to select a skill with exec/network-oriented behaviors when a narrower, safer skill would suffice.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The manifest and main description position this as a focused research/reporting skill, but the later '核心功能' section broadens it into generic automation, file handling, API integration, and command execution. This capability expansion can cause an agent or user to invoke the skill with a much broader trust boundary than expected, increasing the chance of unintended file writes, network access, or shell execution.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill advertises file handling, API integration, and command execution but does not pair those capabilities with clear, prominent user-facing warnings about side effects, data exposure, or environment impact. In an agent context, hidden or under-emphasized side effects materially raise the risk of unintended writes, outbound requests, or shell operations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

Claiming system command execution for a research/SEO tool is over-privileged relative to the stated use case, especially with allowed-tools: read exec. Even without explicit malicious commands in the file, this expands the attack surface for prompt injection, unsafe shell invocation, and abuse of the host environment.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.