T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
SKILL.md:17- Finding
Unnecessary Command Execution Capability and Unsafe Privilege-Elevation Guidance
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md:17-19; related privilege-elevation guidance atSKILL.md:168
Vulnerability Type: Excessive tool permissions and privilege-escalation guidance
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable configuration and guidance:
yaml tools: - read - exectext | Insufficient permissions | The current user lacks read/write permissions | Check file permissions and run as administrator |Technical Analysis
The skill declares access to the general-purpose
exectool even though its stated purpose is refining ideas and processing textual input. No executable implementation or narrowly defined command requirement is present in the package. Consequently, arbitrary command execution is not demonstrated to be necessary for the advertised functionality and violates the principle of least privilege.The troubleshooting section compounds this exposure by recommending execution with administrator privileges when permission errors occur. The recommendation does not identify a trusted command, limit the elevated operation, require user confirmation, or advise correcting narrowly scoped permissions first.
This does not prove that the skill itself automatically executes malicious commands. However, on an Agent platform that grants declared tools to loaded skills, the unnecessary capability creates a command-execution channel that could be influenced by malicious user input, prompt injection in processed content, or future unsafe instructions.
Attack Path
- A user installs or loads the skill on a platform that grants the tools declared in
SKILL.md. - The platform makes the unrestricted
execcapability available during skill execution. - An attacker supplies crafted content that attempts to induce the Agent to invoke shell commands.
- If the Agent follows the injected instruction without adequate confirmation or command restrictions, commands execute with the Ag ...[truncated 1103 chars]
- A user installs or loads the skill on a platform that grants the tools declared in
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Remove
execfrom the declared tools because the documented idea-refinement workflow can operate through LLM text processing without shell access. - If a future implementation genuinely requires command execution, replace unrestricted execution with a narrowly scoped tool or an explicit allowlist of fixed commands and validated arguments.
- Require clear user confirmation before every command that writes files, accesses sensitive locations, installs software, or changes system configuration.
- Run the Agent as a dedicated, unprivileged account with access restricted to the intended workspace.
- Replace the blanket recommendation to run as administrator with guidance to diagnose ownership and grant only the minimum required permission to the specific resource.
- Reject shell metacharacters and avoid constructing commands from untrusted
content,format, oroptionsvalues. - Add platform-level controls for prompt-injection resistance, command logging, execution timeouts, filesystem isolation, and network restrictions.
- Remove
