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Security audit

HTML设计工具免费版

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a design helper, but it asks for broad command, file, and browser/API capabilities that are not clearly scoped to HTML/CSS page creation.

Review this skill before installing. It does not show malware, persistence, or data theft, but it grants or advertises more authority than a design helper normally needs. Only use it in a constrained workspace, avoid exposing private files or secrets, and require confirmation before any shell command, network/API call, or file write.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:5
Finding

Overprivileged and Inconsistent Tool Permissions

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 5 and 18–22
Vulnerability Type: Excessive tool permissions and inconsistent access-control configuration
Risk Level: Medium

The skill declares command execution and arbitrary file-reading capabilities despite its stated purpose being HTML/CSS design assistance. It also declares browser access in one tool list but omits it from the separate allowed-tools field.

yaml
allowed-tools: read exec
yaml
tools:
  - exec
  - read
  - browser

The document later describes additional broad capabilities:

markdown
- **File processing**: Supports reading, parsing, and writing multiple file formats
- **API integration**: Calls external services through standardized interfaces
- **Command execution**: Executes system commands in a secure sandbox

Technical Analysis

Generating HTML, CSS, design recommendations, color palettes, and typography guidance does not inherently require general-purpose shell execution, arbitrary local-file reading, or browser/network access. Granting these tools therefore violates the principle of least privilege.

The duplicated permission declarations are inconsistent: allowed-tools permits read and exec, while the later tools list additionally includes browser. Depending on how an agent platform resolves these fields, browser access may be unexpectedly enabled or permission enforcement may differ between runtimes.

The skill does not contain a malicious command, remote payload, or direct instruction to access sensitive files. Exploitation would therefore require attacker-controlled input, generated content, or another untrusted instruction to influence the tool-enabled agent. The exposed capabilities nevertheless increase the consequences of such manipulation.

Attack Path

  1. The agent loads the skill and grants the declared read, exec, and potentially browser capabilities.
  2. An ...[truncated 1424 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Remove exec, read, and browser from the skill unless a documented workflow strictly requires each capability. Pure HTML/CSS generation should normally require no tools.
  2. Consolidate permissions into one authoritative declaration. Ensure allowed-tools and tools cannot grant different capabilities.
  3. If file access is necessary, restrict it to an explicitly approved project directory and deny access to credentials, home directories, environment files, SSH material, and system paths.
  4. If command execution is necessary, replace general shell access with narrowly scoped operations. Use fixed argument arrays, an explicit command allowlist, no shell interpolation, and mandatory user confirmation for consequential actions.
  5. If browser access is necessary for previewing generated pages, limit it to local preview URLs or an explicit origin allowlist. Block arbitrary external navigation and downloads by default.
  6. Remove or narrow unsupported generic claims about file writing, API integration, and command execution.
  7. Document the exact security boundary, sandbox restrictions, approved commands, accessible paths, and network destinations.
  8. Add tests that reject undeclared tools, permission-list inconsistencies, arbitrary command arguments, out-of-scope file paths, and unapproved network destinations.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Findings (7)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The activation description is broad and ambiguous, making it likely the skill will match many generic design-related prompts beyond its safe intended scope. Over-broad routing increases the chance that an agent will invoke a skill with unnecessary privileged tools for tasks that do not require them.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The example HTML hard-codes '', which imposes a specific language/locale choice. The file does not indicate that users can choose another locale or that the skill is restricted to a China-specific compliance context.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

Exposing shell command execution for a visual HTML/CSS design assistant violates least privilege because design generation does not inherently require arbitrary command execution. If invoked by an agent, this unnecessary capability could be abused to run local commands, inspect the environment, or chain into broader host access.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill is presented as an HTML/CSS design assistant, but the documentation later claims broad automation features including file processing, API integration, and command execution. This scope mismatch can cause an agent or user to grant the skill more trust and privileges than its stated purpose warrants, increasing the chance of unintended data access or command use.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill advertises multi-format file reading, parsing, and writing despite being described as a design assistant. Unnecessary file capabilities expand the attack surface by enabling access to local content unrelated to page design, which could expose sensitive files or overwrite user data if an agent over-trusts the skill.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

Claiming standard external API integration is unjustified for a local HTML/CSS page-generation helper and broadens the skill beyond its stated role. Network/API access can enable data exfiltration, unreviewed third-party interactions, or hidden dependency on remote services that users did not expect to authorize.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

At L286-L287, the skill states it is driven by Markdown instructions and needs no extra API key. Later, L325 discusses API-key handling through environment variables, which contradicts the earlier operational claim and creates confusion about whether the skill actually depends on secret-based external services.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.