T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
SKILL.md:11- Finding
Excessive Tool Permissions for a Strategy-Generation Skill
- Content
View full analysis
Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 11–14
Vulnerability Type: T05: Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
yaml tools: - read - exec - writeTechnical Analysis
The skill declares unrestricted file-reading, file-writing, and command-execution capabilities even though its primary function is to generate go-to-market strategies through language-model reasoning. The document later advertises generic file processing, API integration, command execution, and information retrieval, but it does not establish a concrete operational requirement for privileged system access.
This configuration violates the principle of least privilege. In an Agent platform that grants the declared tools without strict path, command, and network restrictions, untrusted task content or prompt injection embedded in user-supplied market data could cause the Agent to invoke capabilities unrelated to go-to-market analysis.
No explicitly malicious command, credential-access instruction, persistence mechanism, remote payload, or data-exfiltration routine was found. The vulnerability arises from excessive capability exposure rather than a hardcoded malicious payload.
Attack Path
- A user or automated workflow loads the skill, making the declared
read,write, andexectools available to the Agent. - The workflow supplies attacker-controlled input as a product description, market document, customer dataset, or other GTM material.
- The input contains instructions directing the Agent to perform an unrelated local action, such as reading a sensitive file, modifying a workspace file, or executing a system command.
- Because these tools are declared by the skill despite not being required for strategy generation, the Agent may treat the requested operation as authorized.
- If the hosting platform lacks independent sandboxing and approval controls, the oper ...[truncated 801 chars]
- A user or automated workflow loads the skill, making the declared
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Remove
exec,read, andwritefrom the default tool declaration because the documented GTM-planning workflow can operate using language-model reasoning alone. - If file input is necessary, replace unrestricted reading with a read-only interface limited to explicitly selected files inside a dedicated workspace.
- If report export is required, permit writes only to a designated output directory using fixed filenames or validated relative paths. Reject absolute paths and path traversal sequences.
- Do not grant general command execution. Implement any indispensable operation as a narrowly scoped, parameterized tool with a fixed executable and strict argument validation.
- Require explicit user approval before reading files, writing output, invoking external services, or executing processes.
- Isolate the Agent in a sandbox with minimal filesystem access, no inherited secrets, restricted environment variables, disabled outbound networking by default, and resource limits.
- Treat all user-provided documents and market data as untrusted content. Ensure instructions embedded in those inputs cannot authorize tool use or override system-level policy.
- Add automated policy tests that fail packaging or publication when a reasoning-only skill declares filesystem or process-execution permissions.
- Remove