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Security audit

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Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill appears to be a feed-to-Markdown helper, but it asks for command execution and gives broad, unclear instructions beyond that narrow purpose.

Install only if you are comfortable granting this skill file read/write and command execution authority. Treat it as needing careful review because the package does not include the claimed converter and does not clearly define what commands, files, APIs, or secrets it may use.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:14
Finding

Excessive System Command Execution Capability

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 14-17; related declarations at lines 88-90 and 196-200
Vulnerability Type: Excessive privilege and unrestricted command-execution capability
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

yaml
tools:
- read
- exec
- write

Related declarations describe the skill as supporting execution:

text
### Availability Classification
- **Classification**: MD+execute()
- **Description**: Markdown-based AI Skill,
text
## Main Functions
- **Automated execution**: Convert RSS/Atom feeds to Markdown using a bundled local converter
- **File processing**: Supports reading, parsing, and writing multiple file formats
- **API integration**: Calls external services through standardized interfaces and processes responses
- **Command execution**: Executes system commands in a secure sandbox and collects results
- **Information retrieval**: Searches and filters target data

Technical Analysis

The skill requests exec access in addition to file-reading and file-writing permissions. Its stated purpose is to retrieve RSS or Atom feeds and convert them into Markdown, which does not inherently require unrestricted operating-system command execution.

The project contains only SKILL.md. It does not include the advertised converter, an executable allowlist, argument validation logic, a sandbox implementation, or another auditable component that constrains command execution. The skill also accepts a free-form instruction string. Consequently, an Agent that grants the declared capabilities may interpret user-controlled instructions as requests to execute arbitrary system commands.

The documentation recommends using a command allowlist and sandbox, but these controls exist only as prose and are not technically enforced by any included implementation. The finding therefore concerns the unnecessary privilege request and absence of enforceable leas ...[truncated 1562 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Remove the exec capability and implement feed retrieval and conversion using narrowly scoped read, network, and write operations.
  2. Bundle the claimed converter implementation so its behavior can be reviewed rather than leaving command selection to Agent interpretation.
  3. If process execution is essential, invoke only a fixed executable using an argument array. Never construct shell command strings from the instruction, feed URL, output path, or feed content.
  4. Enforce an executable allowlist and reject shell metacharacters, unexpected options, and unsupported argument forms.
  5. Validate feed URLs before use. Restrict schemes to HTTPS where possible and apply network policies that prevent access to loopback, link-local, private, metadata-service, and other sensitive addresses.
  6. Restrict output paths to a dedicated workspace. Resolve and verify canonical paths to prevent traversal, symlink abuse, and writes outside the intended directory.
  7. Run conversion in a sandbox with minimal filesystem access, no inherited secrets, no unnecessary network access, a nonprivileged user, and strict CPU, memory, output-size, and timeout limits.
  8. Define a structured input schema with explicit feed URL and output options instead of accepting unrestricted instructions for execution-sensitive behavior.
  9. Require explicit user approval before any exceptional command execution and record the executable and sanitized arguments in an audit log.
  10. Add tests demonstrating that command-injection payloads, path traversal attempts, unsupported URL schemes, and unauthorized network destinations are rejected.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Findings (5)

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The file claims conversion is performed by a bundled local converter, yet other sections require API key configuration and discuss external API usage. These contradictory signals obscure the actual trust boundary and may lead users to expose secrets or permit network access unnecessarily.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The invocation guidance is overly broad and covers generic file processing, format conversion, content extraction, and workflow use cases unrelated to RSS/Atom conversion. Broad trigger language increases the probability that an agent routes unrelated tasks to a skill with unnecessary permissions, expanding exposure to file, network, or execution side effects.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill is presented as a narrow local RSS/Atom-to-Markdown converter, but later advertises broader capabilities including file operations, API integration, information retrieval, and command execution. This mismatch weakens operator understanding and can cause the skill to be invoked in contexts far beyond its stated purpose, increasing the chance of unsafe tool use.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

Declaring generic command execution for a feed-to-Markdown skill violates least privilege and creates a pathway for arbitrary shell actions if the skill is activated with attacker-controlled input. Even if no exploit text is present here, normalizing command execution in a narrowly scoped skill raises the risk of command injection, data access, or destructive local operations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

The usage guidance says to invoke the skill in an AI Agent conversation and provide inputs, but it does not define specific trigger phrases, required context, or exclusion conditions. In markdown documentation, this leaves activation behavior underspecified and increases the chance of unintended invocation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.