T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
SKILL.md:25- Finding
Overprivileged Tool Permissions for JSON Validation
- Content
View full analysis
Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 25–28
Vulnerability Type: Excessive filesystem and command-execution permissions
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
yaml tools: - read - exec - writeThe broader capabilities are also advertised at lines 220–223:
markdown - **File processing**: Supports reading, parsing, and writing files - **API integration**: Calls external services through standardized interfaces and processes responses - **Command execution**: Executes system commands in a secure sandbox and collects results - **Information retrieval**: Quickly searches and filters target dataTechnical Analysis
The skill declares general-purpose
read,write, andexecaccess even though its stated primary purpose is JSON syntax and structure validation. That task can ordinarily be implemented with a constrained JSON parser and does not require unrestricted command execution, file modification, external API access, or general information retrieval.Although the document recommends command whitelisting and sandboxing, the reviewed package contains no implementation, command whitelist, permitted-path policy, endpoint allowlist, or enforceable sandbox configuration. The package consists solely of
SKILL.md; no validator or other code is included. Consequently, the documented safeguards cannot be verified or enforced by package content.This violates the principle of least privilege. If the hosting agent grants the declared tools based on the skill metadata, malicious or crafted input could potentially influence the agent into using those capabilities for actions outside JSON validation.
Attack Path
- A user or platform loads the skill and grants the declared
read,write, andexectools. - An attacker supplies crafted content that is treated as instructions or otherwise influences the agent's tool-use decisions.
- The agent is induced to read l ...[truncated 1261 chars]
- A user or platform loads the skill and grants the declared
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Remove
execandwritefrom the declared tools because they are unnecessary for in-memory JSON validation. - Use a built-in, non-executing JSON parser with no shell invocation.
- If file input is necessary, permit read-only access only to a file explicitly selected by the user and constrain access to an approved workspace directory.
- If output-file creation is genuinely required, restrict writes to a dedicated output directory, reject traversal sequences, resolve canonical paths before access, and prevent overwriting existing or sensitive files.
- If command execution cannot be eliminated, define an exact executable and argument allowlist, prohibit shell interpretation, pass arguments as a structured array, impose time and resource limits, and run under a low-privilege sandbox.
- Define and enforce an endpoint allowlist before enabling API integration. Require explicit user approval before transmitting content and prevent secrets from being included.
- Add a concrete implementation and automated security tests so the documented path, command, input-size, and network restrictions can be verified.
- Remove unsupported capability claims and the absent
assets/expanso-json-validate_templatereference, or include and audit the required implementation assets.
- Remove
