T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
SKILL.md:20- Finding
Overprivileged Command Execution and Unsafe Elevation Guidance
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 20–23; supporting guidance at lines 219–223 and 236
Vulnerability Type: Excessive tool permissions and unsafe privilege-escalation guidance
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
yaml tools: - read - exec - writeThe Skill additionally advertises general system-command execution at lines 219–223 and recommends running with administrator privileges when file permissions are insufficient at line 236.
Technical Analysis
The stated task is limited to creating, inspecting, and editing user-selected XLSX workbooks. Such operations ordinarily require narrowly scoped access to the selected input and output files and a spreadsheet-processing library. The unrestricted
execcapability is not justified by a concrete implementation or a documented set of required commands.The Skill does not define:
- A command allowlist.
- Validation or escaping rules for command arguments.
- Filesystem boundaries for
readandwrite. - A prohibition against shell interpolation.
- Enforced sandbox controls.
- An allowlist of external API endpoints.
- A reason that XLSX processing requires administrator privileges.
The recommendation to use administrator privileges weakens the operating system's least-privilege boundary. The Markdown document does not itself elevate privileges or contain an executable payload, but an Agent following this guidance could execute workbook-processing operations with substantially broader access than the task requires.
Attack Path
- An Agent loads the Skill and grants it
read,write, andexeccapabilities. - The Agent receives an XLSX path, workbook-derived content, or additional user-controlled arguments.
- Because no concrete safe implementation is supplied, the Agent constructs or invokes a system command to process the workbook.
- Untrusted path or workbook-derived data reaches the command invocat ...[truncated 1109 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Remove the
execpermission and use a dedicated XLSX-processing API or a narrowly scoped spreadsheet library. - Restrict file access to explicit, user-approved
.xlsxinput and output paths. - Resolve and canonicalize paths before access, reject traversal outside an approved workspace, and reject symbolic-link escapes where applicable.
- Remove the recommendation to run the Agent or workbook operation as an administrator.
- If command execution is indispensable, define an exact executable allowlist and invoke programs through argument arrays without a shell.
- Validate every argument by type, extension, size, and approved path before execution. Never interpolate workbook content, sheet names, formulas, or file paths into shell command strings.
- Enforce a sandbox with minimal filesystem permissions, no inherited credentials, resource limits, and networking disabled unless explicitly required.
- If external API access is intended, identify the provider and allowlist exact HTTPS endpoints. Replace the generic API-key requirement with a least-privileged, service-specific credential.
- Reconcile the contradictory capability declarations that describe the Skill both as command-executing and as pure Markdown.
- Add a concrete, reviewable implementation and security tests covering path traversal, shell metacharacters, malicious workbook content, symbolic links, oversized files, and permission failures.
- Remove the
