T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
SKILL.md:21- Finding
Overly Broad File and Command Execution Permissions
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 21–24
Related Locations:SKILL.md, lines 178–180 and 193
Vulnerability Type: Excessive tool permissions and unsafe privilege guidance
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
yaml tools: - read - exec - writeTechnical Analysis
The Skill requests generic file-read, file-write, and command-execution capabilities even though its stated purpose is managing domains and DNS records through cloud-provider APIs. It does not define restrictions on executable commands, command arguments, filesystem paths, destination hosts, or DNS zones.
Lines 178–180 further advertise general file processing, API integration, and system-command execution. Although line 171 claims that commands should be allowlisted and executed in a sandbox, the project contains no implementation that enforces either control. Line 193 also recommends retrying operations with administrator privileges when filesystem permissions are insufficient. Such escalation is generally unnecessary for provider API operations and can increase the consequences of an unsafe generated command.
The declaration does not independently grant operating-system privileges; the actual exposure depends on how the hosting agent interprets the tool list. If the host grants these tools without additional policy enforcement, the Skill can act with all filesystem and process privileges available to the agent.
Attack Path
- A user or attacker supplies a crafted DNS-management instruction containing shell syntax, a malicious path, or misleading operational steps.
- The agent loads the Skill and exposes the declared
read,write, andexectools. - Because the Skill defines no enforceable command, argument, path, hostname, or provider allowlist, the agent may translate the instruction into an unrestricted filesystem or shell operation.
- The operation reads or modifies files unrelated to DNS ...[truncated 1209 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Remove
execand generic filesystem permissions unless they are strictly required for a documented DNS workflow. - Prefer direct, typed integrations with Cloudflare, DNSimple, and Namecheap APIs instead of constructing shell commands.
- If command execution is unavoidable, enforce a fixed allowlist of executable paths and subcommands. Pass arguments as arrays and prohibit shell interpolation, redirection, command substitution, and metacharacters.
- Restrict file access to explicitly approved working directories. Resolve canonical paths and reject traversal, symlink escapes, absolute paths outside the workspace, and writes to executable or system locations.
- Restrict outbound traffic to documented HTTPS API endpoints and validate TLS certificates.
- Require explicit confirmation before DNS record creation, modification, deletion, zone transfer, or other destructive or billable operations.
- Use provider tokens limited to the necessary account, zone, operation, and lifetime. Do not use account-wide administrative credentials.
- Remove the recommendation to run as administrator. Permission errors should instead be resolved by narrowing the operation or assigning the minimum required resource permission.
- Implement the claimed sandbox and allowlist controls in enforceable host policy or code rather than relying on documentation.
- Add audit logging with secret redaction and tests proving that unapproved commands, paths, hosts, and shell metacharacters are rejected.
- Remove