T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
SKILL.md:25- Finding
Excessive File-System and Command-Execution Permissions
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 25–28; related capability claims at lines 240–244
Vulnerability Type: Violation of least privilege through unnecessary Agent tool permissions
Risk Level: Mediumyaml tools: - read - exec - writeTechnical Analysis
The Skill declares access to file-reading, file-writing, and command-execution tools even though its stated primary purpose is to provide DeepSeek chat integration. These system-level capabilities are not necessary for a narrowly implemented chat API client.
The related capability overview at lines 240–244 explicitly advertises arbitrary file processing, external API integration, and system-command execution. However, the package contains no implementation that restricts accessible paths, defines an allowed-command list, validates command arguments, requires confirmation before side effects, or enforces the claimed sandbox.
Tool declarations do not independently prove that a host Agent will grant unrestricted access. Nevertheless, requesting all three capabilities materially expands the Skill's potential authority and violates least-privilege design. If the hosting Agent trusts these declarations or follows subsequent requests under the Skill's context, the exposed tools could be used for operations unrelated to chat.
Attack Path
- A user installs or loads the Skill in an Agent platform that honors its requested tools.
- The platform grants
read,write, andexeccapabilities based on the Skill manifest. - A request processed in the Skill's context causes the Agent to read an arbitrary local file, write to an unintended path, or execute a system command.
- Because the Skill defines no path constraints, command allowlist, argument validation, or mandatory confirmation boundary, the Agent may perform the operation with its own operating-system privileges.
- Local information could consequently be disclosed or system ...[truncated 1138 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Remove
read,write, andexecfrom the tool declaration unless each capability is essential to an implemented and documented workflow. - For a chat-only integration, expose a narrowly scoped HTTPS client restricted to the required official DeepSeek API origin and approved request methods.
- If file access is genuinely required, restrict it to explicitly approved project-relative paths, reject traversal and symbolic-link escapes, and separate read-only from write access.
- If command execution is unavoidable, replace general-purpose
execaccess with fixed operations and an explicit executable-and-argument allowlist. Do not invoke a shell with user-controlled text. - Require clear user confirmation before any file modification, external transmission of local data, or command with side effects.
- Enforce sandbox restrictions in executable policy or host configuration rather than merely claiming a sandbox in documentation.
- Add an actual implementation and security tests proving that disallowed paths, commands, endpoints, and arguments are rejected.
- Align the documented capabilities with the implemented functionality and remove unsupported claims about file processing and command execution.
- Remove
