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Security audit

云运维编排器

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This cloud automation skill is mostly purpose-aligned, but its broad activation language and incomplete execution guardrails warrant manual review before use.

Install only for clearly intended Terraform/Ansible cloud-operations work. Use least-privilege cloud credentials, require human review before apply, reconcile, or destroy, avoid production automation until the missing command wrapper and allowlist are supplied, and pin dependency installation in a controlled environment.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:342
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Package Installation

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, line 342
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned dependency installation
Risk Level: Medium

Complete Code Snippet:

markdown
| Ansible | CLI | Required | >= 2.15, `pip install ansible` |

Technical Analysis

The documented command installs Ansible and its transitive dependencies from the active Python package index without specifying an exact version, package hashes, or an explicitly trusted index. The >= 2.15 documentation does not constrain the actual pip install ansible command.

Because package resolution is mutable, the code installed and executed can change after this skill has been reviewed. Installation hooks and subsequently invoked package code execute with the permissions of the user or automation agent performing the installation. This creates a supply-chain exposure if the package index, a future release, or a transitive dependency is compromised.

Attack Path

  1. An operator or AI agent follows the dependency instructions and runs pip install ansible.
  2. Pip queries the environment's configured package index and resolves the latest eligible package and transitive dependencies.
  3. A compromised release, dependency, index, or maliciously configured package source supplies attacker-controlled code.
  4. The malicious code executes during installation or when Ansible is subsequently invoked.
  5. It accesses data and permissions available to the installation process, potentially including cloud profiles, environment credentials, infrastructure files, and network access.

Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation could provide arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the user or automation agent installing or running Ansible. In the documented cloud-operations context, the affected process may have access to AWS, GCP, or Azure credentials and Terraform state. The resulting scope could include credential disclosu ...[truncated 105 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Replace the mutable installation command with an audited, exact package version.
  • Pin every transitive dependency in a reviewed lock or requirements file.
  • Record and verify cryptographic hashes, and install with pip --require-hashes.
  • Explicitly configure an approved package index rather than inheriting an unknown environment configuration.
  • Install dependencies in an isolated virtual environment or container under a nonprivileged account.
  • Scan and periodically review locked dependencies before updating them.
  • Keep cloud credentials unavailable during dependency installation whenever possible.

Example hardened workflow:

bash
python3 -m venv .venv
. .venv/bin/activate
python -m pip install --index-url https://pypi.org/simple \
  --require-hashes -r requirements.lock

The requirements.lock file should contain exact versions and reviewed SHA-256 hashes for Ansible and all transitive dependencies.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (4)

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The description says the skill should be used for security detection, compliance audit, vulnerability scanning, and encryption protection, and adds that it is not suitable for unauthorized penetration testing. However, the rest of the file documents only IaC orchestration workflows such as init/plan/apply/destroy/drift/config, with no penetration-testing or vulnerability-scanning code path described. This is an active intent mismatch inside the documentation itself.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The activation and use description is broad enough to invite the skill for loosely related tasks such as security detection, compliance audit, vulnerability scanning, and encryption protection, despite the file mainly describing infrastructure orchestration. In an autonomous agent environment, ambiguous scope increases the chance the skill is invoked in the wrong context and given sensitive authority or data it was not designed to handle safely.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The keyword trigger list is extremely broad and includes generic cloud and infrastructure terms without guardrails, making accidental or inappropriate activation more likely. Because the skill has read/write/exec capabilities and can affect real cloud environments, over-broad triggering materially raises the risk of unintended destructive or privileged actions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The skill claims command execution is safe and does not concatenate user input, but elsewhere exposes free-form inputs and exec-based orchestration without defining validation, allowlists, or fixed command templates. In an agent setting, this gap can enable unsafe command construction or prompt-to-shell injection if an implementation follows the broad interface literally.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.