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Security audit

Cloud Architect Free

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is mainly a cloud-architecture helper, but its scope and authority are broad and inconsistently described.

Install only if you want a basic cloud-architecture advisory skill and are comfortable reviewing any generated Terraform, cloud CLI commands, file writes, or API use before running them. Treat the included infrastructure snippets as examples, not production-ready templates.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:214
Finding

Globally Exposed Plaintext HTTP and Unrestricted Outbound Traffic

Content
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Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 214–231
Vulnerability Type: Insecure cloud network configuration
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code:

hcl
ingress {
  from_port   = 80
  to_port     = 80
  protocol    = "tcp"
  cidr_blocks = ["0.0.0.0/0"]
}
ingress {
  from_port   = 22
  to_port     = 22
  protocol    = "tcp"
  cidr_blocks = ["10.0.0.0/16"]
}
egress {
  from_port   = 0
  to_port     = 0
  protocol    = "-1"
}

Technical Analysis

The Terraform example exposes the web service to every IPv4 address over unencrypted HTTP. Traffic sent over port 80 lacks transport confidentiality and integrity unless encryption is implemented separately at the application layer.

The security group also permits all outbound protocols and destinations. Although unrestricted egress does not independently compromise the instance, it weakens containment after a web-service compromise by allowing arbitrary command-and-control connections, payload retrieval, or data exfiltration.

These defaults conflict with the Skill's stated principles of encrypted data transmission and least-privilege access. Because the configuration is presented as a foundational AWS architecture example, users may deploy it without sufficient production hardening.

Attack Path

  1. A user deploys the provided Terraform example.
  2. The EC2 web service becomes reachable from the public internet on TCP port 80.
  3. An attacker observes or manipulates plaintext traffic through an applicable network position, or targets a vulnerability in the publicly reachable web service.
  4. If the instance is compromised, the unrestricted egress rule permits communication with arbitrary external hosts.
  5. The attacker may retrieve additional payloads, establish command-and-control traffic, or exfiltrate data accessible to the compromised instance.

Impact Assessment

Plaintext HTTP may expose application re ...[truncated 477 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Terminate TLS through an Application Load Balancer, API Gateway, reverse proxy, or the application itself.
  • Permit public access on TCP port 443 and redirect TCP port 80 to HTTPS only when an HTTP redirect is required.
  • Configure valid certificates through AWS Certificate Manager or another trusted certificate authority.
  • Restrict outbound traffic to the exact protocols, ports, and destinations required by the workload.
  • Use VPC endpoints for supported AWS services to reduce unnecessary internet egress.
  • Add network monitoring through VPC Flow Logs, GuardDuty, and appropriate egress alerts.
  • Clearly label simplified examples as non-production and document the hardening required before deployment.

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:245
Finding

RDS Final Recovery Snapshot Disabled

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, line 245
Vulnerability Type: Unsafe database deletion and recovery configuration
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code:

hcl
resource "aws_db_instance" "db" {
  engine               = "postgres"
  engine_version       = "15.4"
  instance_class       = "db.t3.micro"
  allocated_storage    = 20
  storage_encrypted    = true
  db_name              = "appdb"
  username             = "dbadmin"
  password             = var.db_password
  publicly_accessible  = false
  skip_final_snapshot  = true
}

Technical Analysis

Setting skip_final_snapshot = true instructs AWS to delete the RDS instance without creating a final database snapshot. This is convenient for disposable test environments, but it is an unsafe default for a general cloud architecture example because it removes an important recovery mechanism.

The configuration does not directly allow an external attacker to delete the database. Exploitation requires an actor, compromised automation process, or compromised AWS principal with sufficient RDS or Terraform permissions to destroy the instance.

Attack Path

  1. A user deploys the supplied RDS configuration and stores operational data in the database.
  2. An authorized operator accidentally runs a destructive Terraform operation, or an attacker compromises a principal with permission to delete the RDS instance.
  3. Terraform or AWS deletes the database instance.
  4. Because final snapshot creation is disabled, no final recovery snapshot is produced.
  5. Data created since the latest independent backup or retained snapshot may become unrecoverable.

Impact Assessment

The primary impact is loss of database availability and potentially permanent loss of application data. The affected scope is the contents of the deleted RDS instance that are not recoverable from another retained backup or snapshot.

This setting grants no a ...[truncated 176 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Set skip_final_snapshot = false for persistent or production databases.
  • Configure a unique final_snapshot_identifier.
  • Enable RDS deletion protection for production workloads.
  • Define an appropriate automated backup-retention period and verify point-in-time recovery.
  • Apply restrictive IAM policies to RDS deletion and Terraform execution.
  • Require review or approval for destructive infrastructure changes.
  • Use lifecycle safeguards such as Terraform prevent_destroy where operationally appropriate.
  • If snapshot skipping is retained for ephemeral test environments, parameterize it and clearly document that it must not be enabled for persistent data.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (8)

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

Line L010 presents the skill as a cloud architecture design tool, then immediately instructs users to use it for design/creative/UI/poster/brand-visual tasks. Those purposes are unrelated and actively contradictory, so the documentation misstates the skill's actual intent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The activation guidance is overly broad and contradictory, causing the skill to match tasks outside its intended domain. In an agent environment with exec/write capabilities, ambiguous triggering increases the chance of unintended invocation and unsafe actions being taken under the wrong user expectations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

L016 says the skill is for security detection, compliance auditing, vulnerability scanning, and encryption protection, while the rest of the file describes a cloud architecture advisory skill. This is an active intent contradiction, not merely missing detail, because it tells users to invoke the skill for a materially different security-tooling purpose.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill advertises read, exec, and write capabilities without clear user-facing consent boundaries, safety prompts, or operational limits. In practice, this can enable file modification or command execution in contexts where the user may believe they are only getting architectural advice, increasing the risk of unintended system impact.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 203)May include surrounding context.

md
user_data = <<-EOF
    #!/bin/bash
    yum install -y httpd
    systemctl enable httpd
    systemctl start httpd
  EOF
# ...

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

L295 states no extra API key is needed beyond the agent's built-in LLM, but L391 says some functions require platform-specific API keys. These statements cannot both be true and create a direct contradiction about operational requirements.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

L010 mixes cloud-architecture functionality with a disclaimer about 3D modeling and animation. That disclaimer belongs to a different kind of skill and contradicts the stated cloud-architecture intent rather than clarifying this skill's behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding

The file states '支持中文交互' and presents the skill primarily in Chinese, but does not indicate that users may choose another language or locale. Under the policy, locale or language constraints should not be imposed without opt-in unless clearly justified.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.