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Security audit

Cloud Architect Design

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is not clearly malicious, but it grants command execution and file read access while mentioning live cloud credentials and deployment without clear safety limits.

Review this skill before installing. Use it for advisory architecture drafting only unless you explicitly intend to connect it to cloud accounts. If you do use cloud CLIs, prefer read-only credentials, inspect every proposed command, require dry-run or plan output first, and avoid giving it broad production deployment permissions.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:26
Finding

Excessive Read and Command-Execution Permissions for a Markdown-Only Skill

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 26–28
Supporting Evidence: SKILL.md, lines 449 and 454
Vulnerability Type: Excessive tool permissions and insufficient least-privilege controls
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

yaml
tools:
  - read
  - exec

Technical Analysis

The Skill declares both unrestricted file-reading and command-execution capabilities. However, its own documentation identifies it as a pure Markdown instruction Skill whose core functionality does not require command-line execution. It also states that optional cloud CLI credentials may be configured for resource queries and deployments.

Granting read and exec by default breaks the principle of least privilege. An Agent executing this Skill could access local files and run commands with the permissions of the hosting process, even though generating cloud architecture recommendations does not inherently require either capability.

The document does not define command allowlists, protected file boundaries, read-only cloud roles, approval gates, dry-run requirements, or restrictions on destructive cloud operations. No directly malicious command or deliberate credential-exfiltration instruction was found, but the unnecessary capabilities create an exploitable privilege boundary if untrusted or manipulated task content influences tool use.

Attack Path

  1. The Skill is loaded with read and exec enabled.
  2. A user optionally configures authenticated AWS, Azure, GCP, or other cloud CLI credentials as described by the Skill.
  3. Untrusted, misleading, or manipulated task content causes the Agent to formulate local shell or cloud CLI commands.
  4. The Agent executes those commands using the host user's local permissions and configured cloud identity.
  5. Depending on the identity's privileges, the commands could inspect local sensitive files, query cloud resources, or modify cloud in ...[truncated 960 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Remove read and exec from the default tool declaration because the documented core functionality only generates advisory content.
  2. Separate architecture generation from operational deployment. Deployment capabilities should require an explicit, independently enabled mode.
  3. Require clear user confirmation immediately before every command that can modify cloud or local resources.
  4. Restrict execution to an allowlist of reviewed commands and arguments; reject shell metacharacters, command chaining, substitutions, and arbitrary scripts.
  5. Use read-only cloud roles for discovery and cost analysis. Grant narrowly scoped deployment roles only for the specific account, project, region, and resource types required.
  6. Default cloud operations to validation, planning, or dry-run modes. Present the generated plan to the user before applying changes.
  7. Prevent access to credential stores, SSH keys, environment-secret files, and unrelated filesystem paths.
  8. Execute approved operational commands in an isolated environment with network, filesystem, time, and resource limits.
  9. Record commands and resulting resource changes in an audit log while redacting secrets and sensitive output.
  10. Document rollback procedures and prohibit destructive commands unless the user provides separate, explicit authorization.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (4)

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill name, display name, summary, and the entire user-facing description are presented in Chinese, with no indication that users may choose another language. Under the policy, a locale or language constraint should not be imposed without opt-in or a clearly documented, justified regional limitation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The manifest describes this skill as a cloud architecture design platform producing architecture strategies, migration plans, FinOps analyses, compliance designs, and DR plans. However, the declared JSON output schema returns review-style fields such as "overall_grade", "total_score", "代码风格", and "安全合规", which semantically match a code/content evaluator rather than a cloud architecture designer.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill describes itself as pure Markdown not requiring exec, yet the manifest grants exec and the documentation mentions optional CLI-based querying and deployment. This mismatch can cause users or agent operators to underestimate the skill's ability to run commands against local or cloud environments, increasing the risk of unintended execution and unsafe trust decisions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill references use of cloud CLI credentials for real resource queries and deployment but does not clearly warn users that it may interact with live infrastructure or handle sensitive credentials. In a cloud-architecture context, this is dangerous because operators may provide powerful AWS/Azure credentials expecting advisory output, leading to accidental changes, exposure of account metadata, or misuse of privileged access.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.