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Security audit

CAD洞察专家

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This CAD drawing analysis skill is mostly purpose-aligned, but users should install its Python dependencies carefully and avoid treating its generic API/key language as required.

Install only in a virtual environment or container, pin and review dependencies before use, and scope the skill to CAD/PDF/DWG drawing analysis. Do not provide API keys, credentials, or broad network permissions based only on this artifact's generic boilerplate.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:255
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Dependency Installation

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 255 and 425
Vulnerability Type: Insecure, unpinned third-party dependencies
Risk Level: Medium

Complete Code Snippet

The same installation command appears at both identified locations:

bash
pip install pdfplumber ezdxf pytesseract pillow opencv-python

Technical Analysis

The skill directs users or agents to install five packages without exact version constraints, package hashes, a lockfile, or a project-controlled dependency manifest. Consequently, installation resolves mutable package versions from the configured Python package index.

Python package installation may execute package build or installation logic. The effective code entering the environment can therefore change after this skill has been reviewed. Although the audit found no evidence that the named packages are currently malicious, the installation method lacks controls needed to ensure dependency integrity, reproducibility, and resistance to future supply-chain compromise.

The project contains only SKILL.md; it does not include an implementation, dependency lockfile, or hash-verified requirements file. The examples also import cad_insight, but that module is neither included in the artifact nor installed by the documented command.

Attack Path

  1. A user or agent loads the skill and follows its environment preparation instructions.
  2. It executes the documented pip install command.
  3. pip queries its configured package index and selects mutable package versions and transitive dependencies.
  4. A compromised or unexpectedly modified dependency is downloaded.
  5. Package build or installation logic executes with the privileges of the account running pip.
  6. The compromised package can then execute whenever it is imported or invoked during CAD processing.

This is a conditional supply-chain path; the reviewed artifact does not itself retrieve a known malicious ...[truncated 662 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Move dependencies into a reviewed requirements or lock file and pin every direct and transitive dependency to an exact version.
  2. Record cryptographic hashes and require verification during installation, for example:
    bash
    pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt
    
  3. Generate the lock file from a trusted environment using a dependency-management tool that supports transitive pinning and hashes.
  4. Explicitly configure and document the trusted package index rather than relying on an ambient pip configuration.
  5. Run dependency vulnerability and provenance checks before publishing each release.
  6. Perform installations in an isolated, least-privileged virtual environment or container.
  7. Add the missing cad_insight implementation or accurately document its trusted source and pin it using the same integrity controls.
  8. Remove the duplicate inline installation commands and direct all installation flows through the verified lock file.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (5)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The activation text is overly broad, including generic data analysis, reporting, statistics, and visualization use cases that extend far beyond CAD drawing analysis. In an agent setting, this can cause the skill to trigger for unrelated user requests and gain access to read/exec/write tools in contexts not intended by the domain-specific skill.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The input schema describes a generic string input containing 'data or instructions' and unconstrained options, which does not limit what the agent may attempt to process. Combined with available exec/read/write tools, this increases the chance of prompt-scope expansion or misuse for arbitrary operations unrelated to CAD analysis.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The capability section claims support for broad create/query/export operations without tying them to engineering drawing artifacts or bounded workflows. Such open-ended language can make the skill appear suitable for arbitrary task execution, increasing the risk of overbroad invocation and unsafe use of its tools.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill advertises API integration, command execution, HTTPS communication, and key handling that are not actually substantiated by the documented CAD-analysis workflows. This mismatch can cause an agent or operator to over-trust the skill’s security posture and capabilities, leading to unnecessary exposure of credentials or permission to use exec/network features beyond the real task scope.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
77% confidence
Finding

The skill's display name, summary, and most instructions are presented in Chinese, while no user language or locale choice is documented. For a general-purpose skill, this can be a language-policy concern because it implicitly assumes a specific language without opt-in.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.