Back to skill

Security audit

brand-guidelines

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is not overtly malicious, but it asks for broad command and integration authority that is not clearly justified by a brand-guidelines purpose.

Review before installing. This skill should be narrowed to brand-guidelines tasks, remove exec unless strictly necessary, and document exact allowed files, commands, APIs, credentials, and user confirmations. I did not find evidence of a malicious payload or persistence, but the current authority and documentation are too broad for automatic trust.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:9
Finding

Excessive and Undefined Tool, Filesystem, Credential, and Network Privileges

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md:9-11, 168-169, 199-202
Vulnerability Type: Excessive privileges and missing least-privilege boundaries
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Configuration and Instructions

yaml
tools:
  - read
  - exec
markdown
1. **Configure API key**: Set the corresponding API Key in environment variables
2. **Initialize connection**: Use the provided credentials to establish an API connection
markdown
- LLM/API Key: The corresponding API key must be configured
- Network connection: Access to external services is required
- Filesystem: File read/write permissions are required
- Runtime environment: Corresponding command-line tools are required

Technical Analysis

The skill advertises generic brand-guideline and data-processing functionality, yet declares arbitrary command execution through exec and broadly states that credentials, external network access, filesystem read/write access, and command-line tools are required.

The document does not define:

  • Which commands may be executed.
  • Which files or directories may be accessed or modified.
  • Which external hosts or API endpoints are permitted.
  • Which credentials are needed or how narrowly they must be scoped.
  • Which operations require user confirmation.
  • How untrusted content or options input is separated from commands.
  • Why arbitrary execution is necessary for the advertised task.

This absence of enforceable boundaries violates least-privilege principles. The package contains only SKILL.md, so there is no implementation demonstrating input validation, command allowlisting, path confinement, secret handling, or destination restrictions.

Attack Path

  1. The skill is loaded with read and exec capabilities.
  2. A user or untrusted data source supplies attacker-controlled content, options, file paths, connection parameters, or processing instructions.
  3. The underspecified “core processing” workflow causes the agen ...[truncated 1272 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Remove the exec tool unless command execution is essential to a clearly documented feature.
  2. If execution is necessary, replace unrestricted execution with a fixed allowlist of commands and arguments; never interpolate untrusted input into shell command strings.
  3. Restrict filesystem access to explicit workspace directories and deny absolute paths, traversal sequences, symbolic-link escapes, and access to credential stores.
  4. Identify every required external API and enforce an outbound allowlist for exact schemes, hosts, ports, and endpoint paths.
  5. Use dedicated, short-lived, least-privileged credentials. Do not expose secrets in prompts, command arguments, output, files, or logs.
  6. Define strict schemas and size limits for content, format, and options, and treat all submitted values as untrusted data rather than executable instructions.
  7. Require explicit user confirmation before commands, file modifications, credential use, or transmission of data to external services.
  8. Document the precise capability required for each operation and deny all unspecified actions by default.
  9. Add implementation-level security tests covering command injection, path traversal, secret disclosure, unauthorized outbound requests, and workspace-boundary enforcement.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Findings (7)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill is presented as a narrow brand-guidelines/data-processing tool, but the body grants and documents much broader capabilities including external API access, filesystem operations, and command execution. This mismatch weakens trust boundaries and can cause users or orchestrators to invoke a skill with far more privilege than its declared business purpose requires, enabling abuse if the content or future implementations are hostile.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

Declaring exec for a brand-guidelines skill is excessive and violates least privilege. If the skill is ever prompted or implemented to transform user content into shell commands, it could execute arbitrary local commands, access sensitive files, or pivot to network activity under the agent's authority.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The applicability section is so broad that the skill could be selected for development, operations, content creation, and general automation tasks without meaningful constraints. Overly broad activation scope increases the risk that a privileged skill is invoked in contexts where its capabilities are unnecessary or unsafe.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The manifest description is generic and does not constrain when the skill should be used, making it easier for routing systems or users to apply it to unrelated tasks. In combination with privileged tools, vague trigger conditions increase the chance of accidental overreach or misuse.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
72% confidence
Finding

The FAQ and top-level sections describe a focused, ready-to-use brand-guidelines skill, but later sections shift to generic troubleshooting for API auth failures, command execution failures, network issues, and filesystem permissions. This documentation does not merely omit details; it describes a substantially different operational model than the earlier skill framing.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The FAQ states that the skill currently supports only Chinese, which is a language restriction presented as a hard requirement rather than a user choice. The policy allows locale constraints only when they are optional or clearly justified; neither condition is present here.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The documentation expands the skill into broad API, filesystem, and command-line workflows unrelated to a narrowly scoped brand-guidelines function. Even if partially boilerplate, this encourages overbroad implementations and permissions, increasing the chance of unsafe data exfiltration, file manipulation, or remote calls beyond user expectation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.