T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
SKILL.md:17- Finding
Overprivileged Tool Permissions for a Content-Writing Skill
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 17–20
Vulnerability Type: Excessive filesystem and command-execution permissions
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Configuration
yaml tools: - read - exec - writeTechnical Analysis
The skill requests general-purpose file-reading, file-writing, and command-execution tools even though its stated purpose is blog planning, drafting, SEO optimization, and output formatting. Routine text generation does not require arbitrary operating-system command execution.
The configuration does not define enforceable command allowlists, filesystem path restrictions, output-directory boundaries, or per-operation user approval. Although the document states that commands should run in a sandbox and mentions allowlisting as a security recommendation, it does not provide configuration that enforces those controls.
Consequently, the skill violates the principle of least privilege. If the hosting agent grants the declared tools without additional platform-level restrictions, untrusted content processed as a writing prompt could attempt to influence the agent into using these capabilities outside the legitimate scope of blog creation.
Attack Path
- An attacker supplies a blog topic, reference document, or other input containing adversarial instructions.
- The skill processes that attacker-controlled content while having access to
read,write, andexec. - The injected instructions attempt to persuade the agent to read unrelated local files, execute operating-system commands, or modify files.
- If the host does not independently enforce sandboxing, path restrictions, and user confirmation, the agent may perform those operations with the privileges of its current process.
- Retrieved information could then be included in generated output or files could be modified within the process account's accessible scope.
No executable implementation ...[truncated 943 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Remove
exec, because command execution is not required for blog generation. - Omit
readby default and enable it only for an explicit source-document ingestion workflow. - Restrict
readto user-selected files or a dedicated input directory. - Restrict
writeto a dedicated output directory and prevent path traversal, symbolic-link escapes, and overwriting of existing files without confirmation. - Prefer returning generated Markdown or HTML directly rather than writing it to the filesystem.
- Require explicit user approval before every filesystem operation that falls outside the designated workspace.
- If command execution becomes essential for a future feature, define an enforceable command-and-argument allowlist, prohibit shell interpolation, run commands in an isolated sandbox, disable network access by default, and apply strict resource and timeout limits.
- Run the skill under a dedicated, non-administrative account with access only to the files required for the current task.
- Treat blog topics, imported references, and callback-related values as untrusted data rather than agent instructions.
- Remove