T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
SKILL.md:25- Finding
Excessive Tool Permissions for an SEO Content-Generation Skill
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 25–28
Vulnerability Type: Excessive file-system and command-execution permissions
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
yaml tools: - read - exec - writeTechnical Analysis
The skill requests file-read, file-write, and system-command execution capabilities even though its declared purpose is SEO article generation, keyword analysis, metadata generation, and content optimization. These content-generation operations can ordinarily be performed using user-supplied text and an LLM without granting operating-system command execution or unrestricted file-system access.
The permission declaration contains no path restrictions, command allowlist, external-service allowlist, argument validation requirements, or approval controls. The document also identifies the skill as executable and claims generic command, file-processing, and API capabilities, but provides no implementation demonstrating that these privileges are necessary or safely constrained.
This violates the principle of least privilege. No direct malicious command or active exploitation logic was found, so the issue is classified as Medium rather than High or Critical.
Attack Path
- An Agent loads the skill and grants the declared
read,write, andexectools. - The user supplies untrusted content, or externally sourced content is included in an SEO-processing request.
- The content contains instructions crafted to influence the Agent into invoking one of the broadly available tools.
- Because the skill defines no path, command, or argument restrictions, the Agent may read files unrelated to the SEO task, modify accessible files, or execute an unintended system command.
- Information obtained through file access or command output may then be exposed in the Agent response or passed to an external service if API functionality is enabled.
This path depends on the hostin ...[truncated 892 chars]
- An Agent loads the skill and grants the declared
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Remove
exec,read, andwritefrom the tool declaration when the skill operates only on content supplied in the conversation. - If file access is required, replace broad access with a dedicated content-import tool restricted to explicitly selected files and an isolated workspace directory.
- Permit writes only to a designated output directory, reject absolute paths and traversal sequences, and prevent overwriting existing files without explicit user approval.
- Avoid system-command execution. If it is indispensable, expose narrowly scoped operations through a fixed command allowlist rather than a general-purpose shell.
- Validate all command arguments as structured data, prohibit shell metacharacters, and invoke executables without shell interpretation.
- Require explicit user confirmation before file modifications, external transmissions, or command execution.
- Restrict external requests to documented HTTPS domains and disclose what content is transmitted.
- Run the skill in a sandbox with minimal operating-system permissions, no access to unrelated credentials, limited network access, and resource limits.
- Update the documentation to explain why each retained tool is required and define enforceable security boundaries for paths, commands, endpoints, and data handling.
- Remove