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Security audit

Azure智能体框架工具-免费版

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a documentation-style Azure AI Foundry helper with disclosed cloud setup steps, but users should be careful with its broad scope and preview dependency installs.

Install and run this only in a controlled project environment, preferably a virtual environment or container. Review and pin dependency versions before use, confirm any Azure CLI or DefaultAzureCredential identity has least-privilege access, and do not let the broad trigger cause this skill to handle unrelated LLM or file-conversion tasks.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:196
Finding

Unpinned Pre-Release Python Dependencies

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 196–197; repeated at lines 355–356
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned and unaudited pre-release dependencies
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code Snippet:

bash
pip install agent-framework --pre
pip install agent-framework-azure-ai --pre

The same installation requirements are repeated in the dependency table:

markdown
| agent-framework | Python package | Required | `pip install agent-framework --pre` |
| agent-framework-azure-ai | Python package | Required | `pip install agent-framework-azure-ai --pre` |

Technical Analysis

The Skill instructs users to install third-party Python packages without exact version constraints, package hashes, or a reviewed lock file. The --pre option explicitly permits mutable pre-release versions, which generally provide weaker stability guarantees and may receive less security scrutiny than stable releases.

Each invocation can resolve a different package version as new releases become available. Python package installation can also execute package-controlled build or installation logic. Consequently, a compromised upstream release, maliciously altered distribution artifact, or otherwise unsafe preview version could execute code in the user's environment during installation.

No malicious package or active compromise was identified in the audited project. The vulnerability is the unsafe dependency acquisition practice and the resulting exposure to supply-chain compromise.

Attack Path

  1. A user follows the setup instructions in SKILL.md.
  2. The user runs the unpinned pip install commands with pre-release resolution enabled.
  3. Pip selects the latest eligible artifacts available from the configured package index rather than a previously reviewed, immutable version.
  4. If an eligible dependency or transitive dependency has been compromised, its package-controlled build or installation logic r ...[truncated 1171 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Replace the unbounded requirements with exact versions that have been reviewed:

    bash
    python -m pip install \
      agent-framework==<reviewed-version> \
      agent-framework-azure-ai==<reviewed-version>
    
  2. Prefer stable releases and remove --pre unless a documented, unavoidable compatibility requirement exists.

  3. Generate and commit a lock file containing all transitive dependencies and cryptographic hashes. Install with hash verification, for example:

    bash
    python -m pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.lock
    
  4. Obtain packages only from an explicitly configured, trusted package index or an organization-controlled artifact repository.

  5. Perform dependency vulnerability, provenance, and license checks before approving updated versions. Review transitive dependencies as well as direct dependencies.

  6. Install dependencies inside an isolated virtual environment or container using a non-privileged account. Do not install with elevated operating-system privileges.

  7. Avoid exposing Azure credentials during dependency installation. Separate environment provisioning from authenticated Agent execution and apply least-privilege Azure roles.

  8. Add an update process that reviews, tests, and re-locks dependency versions deliberately rather than resolving new preview versions during each installation.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (5)

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The description states '支持中文交互' in a way that presents Chinese as the expected interaction language, but it does not offer user language choice or explain a necessary locale limitation. Under the policy, forcing or defaulting to a specific language without opt-in is a natural-language policy concern.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill presents itself as a documentation-only skill, yet it also claims support for operational actions such as create/query/modify/delete. This mismatch can mislead an agent or user into granting broader trust and attempting state-changing actions that are not clearly bounded, increasing the chance of unintended execution or misuse.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

The document claims generic export/save/convert capabilities beyond its stated Azure AI Foundry agent-guidance purpose. Scope expansion like this can cause agents to over-apply the skill to unrelated tasks, including file-handling or data-transformation actions that may expose sensitive data or trigger unintended side effects.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The trigger condition is very broad ('use when AI model calling, dialogue, agent orchestration, LLM applications are needed'), which makes the skill likely to activate for many ordinary requests. Overbroad triggering increases the attack surface by causing this exec-capable skill to be selected in contexts where a narrower, safer skill would be more appropriate.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill advertises 'built-in security checks,' but the content only provides advisory guidance rather than enforceable controls. This can create a false sense of safety, leading operators or downstream agents to trust the skill more than warranted and lower scrutiny around execution and sensitive data handling.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.