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Security audit

Aws Cloud Architect Free

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This AWS helper is not overtly malicious, but it mixes a read-only AWS inventory purpose with executable examples that can change cloud resources and incur costs.

Before installing, use a dedicated read-only AWS IAM profile and do not let the agent execute create, run, put, modify, delete, or terminate AWS commands from this skill without separate manual review. Avoid running it as administrator/root, and treat the generic file/API/command guidance as overbroad for the stated read-only AWS inventory purpose.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:28
Finding

Excessive Tool Permissions and Mutating AWS Operations Contradict the Read-Only Scope

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 28–31, 96, 103–110, 158–163, 205, 250, and 329
Vulnerability Type: Excessive permissions and unsafe privilege guidance
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

The skill requests broad execution and filesystem modification capabilities:

yaml
tools:
  - read
  - exec
  - write

It also presents mutating AWS CLI operations:

bash
aws ec2 create-vpc-endpoint --vpc-id vpc-PLACEHOLDER \
  --service-name com.amazonaws.us-east-1.s3 --route-table-ids rtb-PLACEHOLDER
bash
aws logs put-retention-policy --log-group-name /aws/lambda/fn --retention-in-days 14
bash
aws ec2 run-instances --image-id ami-PLACEHOLDER --instance-type t3.small \
  --tag-specifications 'ResourceType=instance,Tags=[{Key=Environment,Value=prod}]'
aws rds create-db-instance --db-instance-identifier mydb \
  --db-instance-class db.t3.micro --engine postgres --allocated-storage 20

Technical Analysis

The skill describes itself as supporting read-only resource queries and inventory, and line 250 explicitly states that creation, deletion, and modification operations are unsupported. Nevertheless, it requests the unrestricted exec and write tools and provides commands that create EC2 instances, RDS databases, and VPC endpoints or modify CloudWatch log-retention policies.

Textual requirements for explicit confirmation do not technically enforce authorization. There is no command allowlist, IAM-policy enforcement, argument validation, or execution wrapper shown in the audited project. Consequently, an agent can interpret these examples as executable instructions while operating with the user's configured AWS credentials.

The local filesystem write capability is also unnecessary for the declared resource-inventory purpose. In addition, line 329 recommends elevated administrator execution when permissions are insufficient, which conflicts wit ...[truncated 1725 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Remove the write tool because the declared inventory and recommendation workflow does not require filesystem modification.
  2. Replace unrestricted exec access with an allowlisted AWS CLI wrapper that permits only required read operations, such as describe-*, get-*, and list-*.
  3. Use a dedicated AWS IAM role with an explicit read-only policy and deny resource creation, deletion, and modification regardless of prompt instructions.
  4. Remove executable mutating examples from the read-only skill. If retained as documentation, clearly mark them as non-executable and place them outside agent instructions.
  5. Enforce approval through a platform-level authorization control rather than relying solely on natural-language confirmation.
  6. Validate command names and arguments structurally; do not construct shell commands by concatenating user-controlled input.
  7. Remove the recommendation to run as administrator. Report insufficient permissions and provide least-privilege IAM or filesystem guidance instead.
  8. Reconcile the documentation so the declared capabilities, requested tools, examples, and operational restrictions consistently describe a read-only skill.
  9. Add tests that reject all mutating AWS CLI actions, including create-*, run-*, put-*, modify-*, delete-*, and terminate-*.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (8)

Vague Triggers

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The description contains an overly broad invocation phrase unrelated to AWS architecture, making the skill's intended scope ambiguous. In agent systems, ambiguous scope increases the chance the skill is invoked for unrelated tasks and may expose exec/write tooling in contexts not anticipated by the user.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill repeatedly promises read-only AWS resource queries, but this section includes concrete state-changing commands such as creating VPC endpoints and setting log retention policies. In an agent context with exec capability, users or downstream systems may trust the read-only claim and execute these commands, causing unauthorized infrastructure changes and cost or availability impact.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The description states "支持中文交互", and the document consistently presents the skill as Chinese-only without indicating that users may choose another language. This can violate language/locale policy because it imposes a language constraint without opt-in or a clearly justified regional requirement.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

The core feature line says the skill provides "中文交互", presenting the language choice as fixed rather than optional. Because no alternative language option or opt-in is offered nearby, this appears to enforce a locale/language preference in natural language.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

This section includes mutating AWS commands like create-vpc-endpoint and put-retention-policy without an immediate, local warning that the commands change account state and may incur charges. In a copied-command workflow or agent-assisted execution flow, that omission materially increases the risk of accidental changes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The document says the skill does not support IaC/template generation and emphasizes limited capabilities, yet the examples instruct creation of EC2, RDS, and VPC endpoint resources directly. This inconsistency can mislead operators into treating the skill as advisory-only while it effectively provides provisioning guidance that may be executed by an agent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The example block shows resource-provisioning commands for EC2, RDS, and VPC endpoints without explicit warning at the point of use. These commands can create billable infrastructure and alter production environments, which is especially dangerous because the skill otherwise presents itself as read-only and safe for basic use.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The capability boundary says the skill supports only read-only operations, but later sections advertise file writing, API integration, and command execution as general features. This broadens the apparent authority of the skill and can cause an agent or user to overtrust it with actions beyond its declared safety envelope.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.