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Security audit

auto-workflow

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is for automation, but it tells the agent to proactively create and execute scripts without clear user approval or safety boundaries.

Review this skill carefully before installing. It may be useful for drafting automation workflows, but it should not be allowed to run generated scripts, send messages, schedule jobs, access credentials, or modify files unless the agent first shows the exact action and receives explicit approval.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:55
Finding

Autonomous Script Execution Without Explicit User Authorization

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 55–61 and 90–96
Vulnerability Type: Agent instruction hijacking leading to unauthorized command execution
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Instruction Snippet

The following is an English translation of the relevant source instructions:

markdown
## Thinking Pattern

Instead of "answering questions," use "detect repetition → immediately build automation."

When encountering repetitive operations:

* Ask yourself: Can this be written as a script?
* Ask yourself: Can this run automatically next time?
* Do it directly without waiting for the user to request it.
markdown
- **Task identification**: Analyze user input to identify repetitive tasks.
- **Task abstraction**: Abstract the identified task and extract key steps that can be automated.
- **Automation script generation**: Automatically generate an executable script from the abstracted task steps.
- **Script execution**: Execute the generated script to complete the automated task.
- **Result validation**: Verify whether the automation result meets expectations.
- **Exception handling**: Handle errors encountered during execution and record error information.
- **Logging**: Record detailed information about the automation process for subsequent analysis and debugging.

Technical Analysis

The Skill declares access to the exec tool and directs the Agent to generate and execute automation scripts. More importantly, it explicitly instructs the Agent to act immediately without waiting for a user request. This changes the Agent from a request-driven assistant into an autonomous executor and can override the expected requirement that consequential operations receive explicit user authorization.

The document does not require the Agent to:

  • Present generated commands for review before execution.
  • Obtain confirmation for filesystem, network, email, credential, or scheduling o ...[truncated 2731 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Replace the instruction to act immediately with a requirement to obtain explicit user authorization before every execution.
  2. Default to generating a proposed workflow and script without running it.
  3. Display the exact commands, target files, network destinations, expected side effects, and required permissions before requesting approval.
  4. Require renewed confirmation whenever the generated command changes after approval.
  5. Add a mandatory dry-run mode for filesystem changes, email delivery, network transmission, scheduled tasks, and other consequential operations.
  6. Execute approved scripts in a sandbox with minimal filesystem, process, and network privileges.
  7. Apply allowlists for executable programs, writable paths, network destinations, and supported automation operations.
  8. Reject or separately authorize destructive operations such as recursive deletion, permission changes, credential access, persistence creation, and transmission of sensitive data.
  9. Treat user-controlled task descriptions and external content as untrusted input; do not interpolate them directly into shell commands.
  10. Use structured process invocation with separated arguments instead of shell-string construction wherever possible.
  11. Record the approved command, approval event, execution result, and affected resources in an audit log without recording secrets.
  12. Provide a reliable cancellation and rollback mechanism for workflows that modify state.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (8)

Vague Triggers

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The trigger keywords are extremely broad terms like 'auto', 'workflow', and 'builds', which are likely to appear in ordinary conversation. In an agent environment with exec access, this can cause unintended activation of a skill that generates or executes automation steps when the user did not intend to invoke it.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The skill encourages the agent to 'directly do it' by writing scripts and automating repeated tasks, but does not require user confirmation or warn about filesystem, process, network, or account impacts. In a skill with exec enabled, this can lead to unreviewed code generation and execution, including destructive or data-exfiltrating actions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The repeated trigger list remains vague and lacks any constraints on scope, intent, or confirmation. Because this skill is designed to create automation and has exec capability, ambiguous triggering materially increases the chance of unauthorized or accidental system-impacting behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill describes automatic email/report sending without warning that this performs external actions and may transmit data outside the local environment. Users may unknowingly authorize outbound communications, causing privacy leakage or unintended messages to third parties.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 4

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly tells the agent not to wait for user requests and to proactively convert repeated behavior into automation. This creates a gradual permission-escalation pattern where observation of benign activity can turn into script creation and execution without a clear consent boundary, which is especially dangerous given the declared exec tool.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill advertises a runnable Python library and code-defined parameters that are not actually present in the provided artifact. This mismatch is dangerous because users may execute or trust generated code paths that have not been reviewed, and it undermines the transparency needed for safe automation skills.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The document asserts implemented security architecture features such as encryption, access control, and audit logging, but the skill contains no corresponding implementation or enforceable mechanism. This creates false security expectations and may cause operators to permit risky automation under the mistaken belief that safeguards already exist.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill claims secure API-key storage, encryption, access control, and rotation, but elsewhere states it is only Markdown guidance and requires no extra API key. These unsupported security assurances can mislead users into trusting the skill with secrets or assuming protections exist when they do not, creating a documentation-driven security risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.