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Security audit

Api Toolkit Free

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a markdown API-testing helper with no hidden code or persistence, but users should review any generated API commands before running them.

Install this only if you want an API request template/debugging helper. Review generated curl commands before execution, keep tokens in environment variables or placeholders, and be especially careful with POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE, payment, CRM, or account-management endpoints.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (11)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The activation guidance is extremely broad, including generic activities like code generation, programming assistance, debugging, testing, and deployment. This can cause the skill to auto-trigger in many unrelated developer conversations, increasing the chance that its exec-capable behavior and request-generation instructions are invoked unexpectedly.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 43)May include surrounding context.

md
直接对Agent说:

> "帮我发一个 POST 请求到 https://api.example.com/v1/orders,body 是 `{"sku":"A1","qty":2}`,用 Bearer Token 认证。"

Agent会按本工具的模板规则输出:

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 55)May include surrounding context.

md
直接对Agent说:

> "帮我发一个 POST 请求到 https://api.example.com/v1/orders,body 是 `{"sku":"A1","qty":2}`,用 Bearer Token 认证。"

Agent会按本工具的模板规则输出:

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 100)May include surrounding context.

md
直接对Agent说:

> "帮我发一个 POST 请求到 https://api.example.com/v1/orders,body 是 `{"sku":"A1","qty":2}`,用 Bearer Token 认证。"

Agent会按本工具的模板规则输出:

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 103)May include surrounding context.

md
直接对Agent说:

> "帮我发一个 POST 请求到 https://api.example.com/v1/orders,body 是 `{"sku":"A1","qty":2}`,用 Bearer Token 认证。"

Agent会按本工具的模板规则输出:

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 106)May include surrounding context.

md
直接对Agent说:

> "帮我发一个 POST 请求到 https://api.example.com/v1/orders,body 是 `{"sku":"A1","qty":2}`,用 Bearer Token 认证。"

Agent会按本工具的模板规则输出:

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 112)May include surrounding context.

md
直接对Agent说:

> "帮我发一个 POST 请求到 https://api.example.com/v1/orders,body 是 `{"sku":"A1","qty":2}`,用 Bearer Token 认证。"

Agent会按本工具的模板规则输出:

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 295)May include surrounding context.

md
直接对Agent说:

> "帮我发一个 POST 请求到 https://api.example.com/v1/orders,body 是 `{"sku":"A1","qty":2}`,用 Bearer Token 认证。"

Agent会按本工具的模板规则输出:

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 300)May include surrounding context.

md
直接对Agent说:

> "帮我发一个 POST 请求到 https://api.example.com/v1/orders,body 是 `{"sku":"A1","qty":2}`,用 Bearer Token 认证。"

Agent会按本工具的模板规则输出:

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 100)May include surrounding context.

bash
# === API Key (Header) ===
curl -H 'X-API-Key: 配置值' https://api.example.com/v1/data
# ...
# === Bearer Token (JWT/OAuth2) ===
curl -H 'Authorization: Bearer 配置值' https://api.example.com/v1/data

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The keyword coverage section contains an overly expansive list of common technical terms, making accidental invocation highly likely. In an agent environment, broad trigger vocabularies can route ordinary developer tasks into a skill with read/write/exec capabilities, which raises the risk of unintended command generation or execution workflows.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.