Back to skill

Security audit

Anthropics Frontend Design Free

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This frontend design skill appears non-malicious, but it asks for broad read, write, command execution, API, and credential-related capabilities that are not clearly scoped to simple HTML/CSS/JS generation.

Install only if you are comfortable reviewing each requested file operation, command, API call, and callback destination. Prefer running it in a sandboxed project workspace, avoid providing secrets unless a specific trusted API use is required, and do not allow administrator-level execution for routine design generation.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:26
Finding

Excessive Read, Write, and Command-Execution Permissions

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 26-29
Vulnerability Type: Excessive tool permissions and violation of least privilege
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

yaml
tools:
  - read
  - exec
  - write

Technical Analysis

The skill declares unrestricted read, exec, and write capabilities even though its stated purpose is to generate HTML, CSS, and JavaScript frontend designs. Arbitrary command execution and broad filesystem access are not inherently required to generate frontend code.

No technical controls are defined to limit readable or writable paths, constrain commands to an allowlist, require user approval for sensitive operations, or enforce execution inside a sandbox. Although the document recommends allowlisting commands elsewhere, this is descriptive guidance rather than an enforced security control.

The repository contains no executable implementation demonstrating active abuse of these permissions. Nevertheless, granting these capabilities establishes an excessive privilege boundary: adversarial or untrusted design input could influence an agent into using the declared tools for operations unrelated to frontend generation.

Attack Path

  1. An AI agent loads the skill and grants its declared read, write, and exec tools.
  2. An attacker supplies a crafted frontend-design request containing adversarial instructions.
  3. The request attempts to induce the agent to read files outside the intended project scope, overwrite local files, or invoke a system command.
  4. Because the skill defines no enforced path restrictions, command allowlist, or approval checkpoint, the agent may perform the requested operation with its available permissions.
  5. Any resulting access is limited by the operating-system privileges and sandbox restrictions of the agent process, but may extend beyond the legitimate frontend-generation task.

Impact Assessment

Successful e ...[truncated 649 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Remove exec because command execution is not necessary for producing frontend source code.
  2. Remove read unless the user explicitly asks the skill to inspect existing project files.
  3. Grant write only when file output is requested, and restrict writes to a user-approved workspace or output directory.
  4. Require explicit user confirmation before reading existing files, overwriting content, or invoking any external process.
  5. If command execution is indispensable for optional validation, enforce a small allowlist of fixed commands and arguments without shell interpolation.
  6. Run all validation in a restricted sandbox with network access disabled, a read-only host filesystem, resource limits, and a dedicated non-privileged identity.
  7. Reject path traversal and canonicalize paths before every file operation.
  8. Document each required capability and its security boundary so that agent platforms can grant tools per operation rather than for the entire skill session.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Findings (5)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The activation language is broad enough to trigger the skill in many loosely related design or creative contexts. For a skill with declared read/write/exec tools, ambiguous routing increases the risk that it is invoked unexpectedly, causing side effects outside the user's intended task.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill is marketed as a frontend HTML/CSS/JS design generator, but later advertises file handling, API integration, and command execution capabilities. This scope expansion can cause an agent or user to invoke higher-risk actions than expected, increasing the chance of unintended command execution, file modification, or external data transmission under a benign-looking design skill.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill advertises file writing, API calls, and command execution without prominent user-facing disclosure of the operational and security impact. In an agent environment, this can lead to silent filesystem changes, outbound network access, or shell execution under the guise of a simple design-generation workflow.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The description explicitly says '支持中文交互', and the document is written to assume Chinese interaction without presenting language choice or opt-in behavior. This can violate language or locale neutrality expectations when the skill is used in broader environments.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
78% confidence
Finding

Earlier sections consistently describe the skill as generating frontend code from design requests, while the boundary-conditions section says inputs must be valid HTML/CSS/JS code fragments or design descriptions. This does not fully match the earlier intent and suggests a different operational model than the advertised generation-only design assistant.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.