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Security audit

Ai Assistant

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This appears to be a document-analysis skill rather than malware, but it asks for broad command/file/API authority without clear limits or user-confirmation rules.

Install only if you are comfortable with a Review-level skill and can keep it constrained to user-selected documents. Do not allow it to run arbitrary commands, transmit document contents to unspecified APIs or callback URLs, or run with administrator privileges unless you have independently reviewed and limited those actions.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:28
Finding

Excessive Command-Execution and File-Write Permissions

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md:28-31
Supporting Locations: SKILL.md:348-349, SKILL.md:391, and SKILL.md:430
Vulnerability Type: Excessive tool permissions and unsafe privilege-elevation guidance
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Configuration

yaml
tools:
  - read
  - exec
  - write

The supporting documentation at lines 348-349 advertises external API integration and system-command execution. Lines 391 and 430 recommend running with administrator privileges when file permissions are insufficient.

Technical Analysis

The Skill's declared purpose is long-document analysis, summarization, comparison, and rewriting. These activities require access to user-selected input documents and, when requested, narrowly scoped output-file access. General command execution is not intrinsically required for the documented reasoning workflow.

Granting the Skill unrestricted exec and write capabilities violates the principle of least privilege. If untrusted document content, ambiguous user input, or incorrectly interpreted Skill instructions influence tool invocation, the Agent could execute commands or modify files outside the legitimate document-processing scope.

The generic recommendation to use administrator privileges compounds this risk. Elevation should not be used as a general remedy for file-access errors because it expands the impact of any accidental or attacker-influenced command. Although the Skill claims command execution occurs in a sandbox, it does not define sandbox boundaries, permitted commands, filesystem restrictions, or enforcement controls.

No specific malicious command, remote endpoint, payload retrieval mechanism, or implemented exfiltration routine was found. The issue is therefore an excessive-permission vulnerability rather than evidence of an intentionally malicious payload.

Attack Path

  1. A user activates the Skill to process a document.
  2. T ...[truncated 1530 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Remove exec from the default tool declaration unless a specific document parser demonstrably requires command execution.
  2. Use read-only access by default and request write access only when the user explicitly asks to create an output file.
  3. Restrict file operations to user-selected input files and a dedicated output directory using canonical-path validation and filesystem allowlists.
  4. If command execution is unavoidable, use an explicit command allowlist, fixed argument schemas, short timeouts, resource limits, disabled shell expansion, and a sandbox without network access.
  5. Remove the generic recommendation to run as administrator. Resolve permission errors through narrowly scoped ownership or access-control changes instead.
  6. Require explicit user confirmation before executing commands, overwriting files, accessing paths outside the workspace, or transmitting document contents to an external service.
  7. Define an allowlist of permitted external service destinations and document what data is transmitted, retained, and logged.
  8. Treat document contents as untrusted data and explicitly prohibit following instructions embedded within analyzed documents.
  9. Document and test the claimed sandbox boundaries so that the Skill cannot access unrelated files, credentials, environment secrets, or privileged host resources.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (6)

Vague Triggers

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill uses broad activation language such as applying whenever AI model calling, agent orchestration, or LLM applications are involved, without tight scope boundaries. In a skill that also declares read/exec/write tools, this can cause inappropriate invocation in unrelated contexts and expand the chance that sensitive documents or local resources are processed when the user did not intend that level of access.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
78% confidence
Finding

The description explicitly states '支持中文交互' while the skill name and much of the metadata are Chinese-focused, but there is no explicit statement that users may choose another language. For a general-purpose skill, presenting a fixed language mode without opt-in or selectable locale can violate language/locale policy expectations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

A missing or ambiguous trigger section makes it unclear when the skill should activate and under what constraints. Because the skill declares powerful tools and mixes analysis guidance with operational claims, weak triggering boundaries increase the risk of accidental overreach, including unnecessary file access, writes, or command use during ordinary conversations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The '功能介绍' section states capabilities such as API integration, executing system commands in a sandbox, and file read/parse/write operations. However, this SKILL.md is itself just an instructional prompt/spec for long-document reasoning and contains no code or concrete procedures implementing those capabilities; the surrounding content consistently describes text analysis of legal/commercial documents instead.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The markdown advertises file processing, API integration, and command execution, but does not provide prominent user-facing warnings, confirmation gates, or safety constraints for those system-impacting actions. In a skill with declared exec/write tools, that omission can normalize dangerous behavior and lead an agent to perform local or network-affecting operations without the user understanding the consequences.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

Earlier, the dependency section says the LLM API is provided by the agent and '无需额外配置' with the API Key section left blank. Later sections explicitly say API keys are required, should be set via environment variables, and used to establish API connections, which is a direct contradiction in documented intent and operating model.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.