T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
SKILL.md:22- Finding
Excessive Execution and File-Write Permissions in a Documentation-Only Skill
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill claims to be documentation-only but requests execution and write authority and gives broad development-operation instructions without clear limits.
Review this skill before installing. It does not show evidence of a malicious payload, but it asks for command execution and file-writing authority while presenting itself as documentation-only. Only use it in a constrained workspace, avoid exposing cloud credentials unless necessary, and require explicit approval for any command execution or file modification.
SKILL.md:22Excessive Execution and File-Write Permissions in a Documentation-Only Skill
The skill presents itself as documentation-only, but elsewhere declares powerful capabilities like exec, write, code analysis, and operational workflows. This mismatch is dangerous because users or orchestration systems may grant trust, lower scrutiny, or auto-invoke the skill under the assumption that it is passive documentation when it actually describes active behavior.
The documented workflow expands from Azure AI Foundry guidance into generic code reading, editing, refactoring, testing, and validation. That scope expansion breaks least surprise and can cause an agent or user to apply the skill to arbitrary development tasks with file and execution access that are unrelated to the advertised purpose.
The feature list advertises automated execution, file handling, API integration, and command execution despite the earlier documentation-only framing. In a skill ecosystem, this inconsistency can be used to mask risky capabilities behind a benign label, increasing the chance of unsafe invocation and privilege misuse.
The invocation guidance is broad enough to match many generic AI-assistance requests, such as model calling, conversations, agent orchestration, and LLM application use. Overbroad routing criteria can cause the skill to trigger in contexts where its tools and instructions are unnecessary or risky, especially given the declared read/exec/write capabilities.
Telling users to invoke the skill in any AI Agent conversation makes the skill effectively general-purpose despite its claimed specialized role. In a tool-enabled agent platform, ambiguous invocation guidance increases unnecessary exposure of powerful capabilities and encourages use outside safe, intended boundaries.
The skill advertises file writing, external API integration, and command execution in its functional description without prominent upfront warning in the summary/manifest. This is risky because users and orchestrators may not understand that enabling the skill implies actions beyond passive documentation, leading to unsafe consent and authorization decisions.
Introducing command execution in a skill whose stated purpose is documentation and guidance unnecessarily increases operational risk. Even without explicit malicious commands, normalizing command execution broadens the attack surface for prompt injection, misuse, or accidental destructive actions in environments that expose shell access.
No suspicious patterns detected.