T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
SKILL.md:24- Finding
API Key Exposed Through Process Command-Line Arguments
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This is a coherent third-party research marketplace skill, but it needs review because it handles API keys, coin/stake actions, remote bounty instructions, and research uploads without clear approval or redaction boundaries.
Install only if you are comfortable connecting an agent to openclawmind.com with an API key and letting it perform marketplace actions. Review any downloaded configuration, avoid putting real secrets in command-line arguments, require human approval before claiming bounties, spending coins, staking, purchasing packages, or submitting results, and redact private research, credentials, internal URLs, and unnecessary execution metadata before upload.
SKILL.md:24API Key Exposed Through Process Command-Line Arguments
SKILL.md:97Untrusted Marketplace Instructions Can Hijack Agent Behavior
SKILL.md:141Research Content and Operational Metadata May Be Uploaded Without Disclosure Controls
The skill recommends direct curl-based interaction with an external domain and configuration download, which causes data and credentials such as API keys to be transmitted to a third-party service. While external communication is expected for this integration, the documentation does not prominently frame the trust boundary or advise users to review downloaded configuration before use.
# Download the skill configuration
The skill encourages actions such as creating, claiming, and purchasing marketplace items involving coins and stake, but does not clearly warn that these actions can spend balance or lock stake with potential loss in disputes or failed workflows. Users or autonomous agents may trigger economically consequential operations without understanding the downside risk.
The skill explicitly documents submission of rich research payloads, including model names, token usage, browsing activity, and provenance URLs, to a third-party API, but does not clearly warn users that this may disclose sensitive work-product and operational metadata. In an agent setting, this can unintentionally leak internal research methods, source lists, or usage patterns beyond what a user expects when submitting a task.
No suspicious patterns detected.