T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
references/api-reference.md:84- Finding
Reusable Exchange Credentials Are Transmitted to a Central Proxy
- Content
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", "method": "", "params": {}, "credentials": { "apiKey": "...", "apiSecret": "...", "passphrase": "...", "walletAddress": "..." } } ``` ``` The architecture is explicitly described in `references/exchanges.md:3`: ```markdown All exchanges are accessed via the TTC Box proxy at `https://ttc.box`. You never call exchange APIs directly. ``` ### Technical Analysis Every authenticated exchange operation is routed through TTC Box and includes reusable exchange credentials in the request body. This behavior is disclosed rather than covert, but it establishes TTC Box as a centralized trust boundary with access to credentials capable of reading account data and performing trading operations. Sending complete exchange API secrets to an intermediary is not the minimum privilege required for a trading client. A less privileged design would sign exchange requests locally or use delegated, narrowly scoped credentials that cannot be replayed by the proxy. The supplied artifact contains only documentation, so the proxy's credential retention, logging, encryption, isolation, and deletion controls cannot be verified. ### Attack Path 1. A user stores exchange API keys, secrets, and passphrases in the local environment. 2. The client sends those credentials to `https://ttc.box` when an exchange operation is requested. 3. An attacker compromises TTC Box, its request logs, application monitoring, administrative accounts, or credential ...[truncated 748 chars]- Remediation
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